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Article 3

SEX DISCRIMINATION: STATE PROTECTIVE LAWS
SINCE TITLE VII
Joseph P. Kennedy*
Introduction and Scope
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964' was enacted in response to social
injustice in employment opportunities for minority groups. 2 Thus, Title VII
generally prohibits employment discrimination based upon an individual's race,
color, sex, creed or national origin.' While not a minority group in exactly the
same sense as Blacks,4 women are included in the protective coverage of Title

VII.5
This article will examine one particular aspect of sex discrimination-the
validity of state protective laws. Such laws restrict in various ways the employment opportunities and duties of women. This article proposes to provide:
I. A classification of present state protective laws;
II. A summary of judicial treatment of state protective laws prior to the
enactment of Title VII;
III. An analysis of Title VII and the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission's position in this area;
IV. A survey of recent developments in the law;
V. An analysis of arguments against such laws;
VI. Conferring Laws;
* Member of the New York Bar. A.B., Iona College, 1966; J.D., Univ. of Notre
Dame Law School, 1969. Attorney, International Business Machines Corp., Kingston, N.Y.
(The opinions expressed herein are not necessarily those of the International Business Machine
Corp.) The author was Articles Editor of Volume 44 of the Notre Dame Lawyer.
1 78 Stat. 253 (1964), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e to 2000e-15 (1964).
2 H. R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963). See also Hebert and Reichsel, Title
VII and the Multiple Approaches to Eliminating Employment Discrimination, 46 N.Y.U.L.
Rxv. 449, 449-50 (1971); Note, Developments in the Law-Employment Discriminationand
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 84 HAxv. L. Rav. 1109, 1111-14 (1971).
3 78 Stat. 255 (1964), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1) & (2) (1964).
4 E.g., Representative Celler read into the record of the brief debate over the addition of
sex to the Civil Rights Act of 1964 the following statement by the President's Commission on
the Status of Women, contained in a letter from the U.S. Department of Labor, dated
February 7, 1964:
Discrimination based on sex, the Commission believes, involves problems
sufficiently different from discrimination based on other factors listed to make
separate treatment preferable.
In view of this policy conclusion reached by representatives from a variety of
women's organizations and private and public agencies to attack discrimination based
on sex separately, we are of the opinion that to attempt to so amend H.R. 7152
would not be to the best advantage of women at this time.
110 CONo. Rac. 2577'(1964). See also id. at 2581 (remarks of Representative Green): The sex
amendment "will clutter up the bill and it may later-very well-be used to help destroy this
section of the bill by some of the very people who today support it." Cf. 78 Stat. 256 (1964), 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (1964) (no bona fide occupational qualification for race or color).
However, there are striking similarities between racial and sexual discrimination. See
Sail'er Inn, Inc. v. Kirby, 95 Cal. Rpt'r 239, 485 P.2d 529, 540 (1971); Murray and Eastwood, lane Crow and the Law: Sex Discriminationand Title VII, 34 GEo. WASH. L. Rnv.
232, 233-35 (1965).
5 78 Stat. 255, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) & (2) (1964).

SEX DISCRIMINATION

(Vol. 47:• 514]

VII. A discussion on whether restrictive laws are invalid on their face,
or only as applied in certain fact situations.
I. A Classification of State Protective Laws
Today most states have some form of protective laws on the books," although
not all are enforced or enforceable for various reasons. These laws may be
classified into three types:
1. those which restrict the employment of women (restrictive legislation);
2. those which prohibit the employment of women (prohibiting legislation);
3. those which provide additional benefits to women (conferring legislation).
The most common of the restrictive type are those which generally limit the
number of hours all women,7 or women under a certain age,8 may work in various
industries. Such laws may also limit the shifts or time of day that women may
work' and the amount of weight women may lift."
The second type (prohibitive) usually provide either a blanket prohibition
against women working in certain occupations (most common: bartending"
and mining3 2 ), or in various occupations during certain time periods related to
childbirth.'
The third type (conferring) include laws providing for premium overtime

6 For a "bird's eye view" of the laws of all the states see 3 CCH LAB. L. R P., STATE
LAWS
49,531 (1971).
7 ARx. STAT. ANN. § 81-601 (1960) (exception for women covered by Fair Labor
Standards Act); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-12 (Supp. 1971-72); D.C. CODE ENCYCL. ANN.
§ 36-301 (1968); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-640 (1964) (no more hours than consonant with
health); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 337.380 (1969); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 23:311,
:332 (1964); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 731 (1964); MD. ANN. CODE art. 100, §
52 (Supp. 1971) (exception for women covered by Fair Labor Standards Act); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 181.18 (1966); Miss. CODE ANN. § 6993 (1952); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 290.040
(Supp. 1970-71); NEv. REv. STAT. § 609.110 (1969); N.H. Rv.
STAT. ANN. § 275:15
(1966); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 59-5-1 (Supp. 1971); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-17 (Supp.
1969); N.D. CENT. CODE § 34-06-06 (Supp. 1971); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 81
(1954); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 28-3-11 (1968); S.C. CODE ANN § 40-81 (Supp. 1970);
S.D. CODE § 60-12-1 (1967); TENN. CODE ANN. § 50-718 (1966); TEx. Rnv. Cw.
STAT. ANN. art. 5172a(1) (1971) (conditioned on employee's consent); UTAH CODE ANN. §
34-22-3 '(Supp. 1971); VA. CODE ANN. § 40.1-35 (1970) (exception for women covered by
F.L.S.A.); WASHa. RaV. CODE ANN. § 49.28.070 (Supp. 1970); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 103.02
(Supp.1971-72).
8 N.Y. LABOR LAw § 173 (McKinney Supp. 1970-71) '(women under 21 years of age).
9 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-19 (1960); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 149, § 59 (Supp.
1970); N.Y. LABOR LAW § 1733 (McKinney Supp. 1970-71) '(women under 21 years of age).
10 E.g., MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 149, §§ 53, 53A (Supp. 1970).

11 A.LASxA
Ky. Rzv. STAT.

STAT.
ANN.

§ 04.15.090 (Supp. 1970); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 30-81 (1960);
§ 244.100 (1969); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 3-8-2 (Supp. 1970). Such

laws may also be found on the municipal level; see ST. PAUL MUNIc. ORD. 8604 (1945),
upheld in Anderson v. City of St. Paul, 226 Minn. 186, 32 N.W.2d 538 '(1948).
12 ALA. CODE tit. 26, § 166(108) (1958); Ax. STAT. ANN. § 52-612 (Supp. 1969); CoLo.
RYv. STAT. ANN. § 92-10-2 (1963); N.Y. LABOR LAW § 405 (McKinney 1965); OICLA. CONST.
art. 23, § 4; UTAH CONST. art. XVI, § 3(1).
13 Mo. ANN. STAT. § 290.060 (1965); N.Y. LABOR LAW § 206-b (McKinney 1965).
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pay for women, 4 or a minimum wage for women,
&
facilities" and rest periods
" for women.
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and laws requiring special

II. A Summary of Judicial Treatment of State Protective
Laws Prior to the Enactment of Title VII
This section examines the most important decisions of the United States
Supreme Court and their impact on women's employment rights prior to the
enactment of Tite VII. While the rationale of these cases may seem outdated
today, the decisions still constitute an important part of the law in this area.
In Bradwell v. State,"8 decided in 1873, the Supreme Court upheld a law
which had been construed by the courts of Illinois as restricting admission to that
state's Bar to males only, in the face of an attack under the privileges and immunities clause of the fourteenth amendment. The opinion of the Court merely
held that the right to practice law was not a privilege and immunity of a citizen of
the United States. 9 The concurring opinion of three Justices maintained that the
privileges and immunities clause does not grant women the right to engage in
every profession or occupation.2"
On the contrary, the civil law, as well as nature herself, has always recognized
a wide difference in the respective spheres and destinies of man and woman.
Man is, or should be, woman's protector and defender. The natural and
proper timidity and delicacy which belongs to the female sex evidently unfits it for many of the occupations of civil life....
...The paramount destiny and mission of woman are to fulfil [sic]
the noble and benign offices of wife and mother. This is the law of the
Creator. And the rules of civil society must be adapted to the general constitution of things, and cannot be based upon exceptional cases. 2'
2
Bradwell was reaffirmed in 1894 in a similar decision under a Virginia statute.
The concurring opinion in Bradwell presaged the Supreme Court's disposition of

14 ARK. STAT. ANN. § 81-601 (1960), upheld in Potlatch Forests, Inc. v. Hays, 318 F.
Supp. 1368 (E.D. Ark. 1970); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 44-1107 (Supp. 1969); OrE. REv. STAT.
§ 653.265 (1969).
15 E.g., MiNN. STAT. ANN. § 177.07(1) (1966).
16 Ax". CODE, tit. 26, § 337 (1958) (seats and water closets); D.C. CODE ENCYOL. ANN.
§ 36-310 (1968) (seats); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 44-1108 (1948) (seats); N.Y. LABOR LAw §
203-b (McKinney 1965) (seats); OHIo R.Ev. CODE ANN. § 4107.42 (Page 1965) (seat); VA.
CODE ANN. § 40.1-34 (1970) (seats and restrooms).
17 ARK. STAT. ANN. § 81-609 (1960); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 337.365 (1969); NEv.
RMv. STAT. § 609.120 (1967); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4107.46(E) (Page 1965).

18
19

83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1872).
Id. at 139. Cf. Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162 (1874) (voting is not a

privilege under the fourteenth amendment).

20 Bradwell v. State, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 140-41 (1873) '(concurring opinion).

21 Id. at 141-42 (concurring opinion). While such a statement would no doubt chagrin
the Woman's Liberation movement, Justice Bradley did go on to say that he heartily concurred

in the female civil rights movement of that day. Id at 142 (concurring opinion). Although
woman attorneys have come a long way since Bradwell, the opinion also predicted the troubles
a woman might encounter even upon admission to the Bar. See Sassower, Women in the Law:
the Second Hundred Years, 57 A.B.A.J. 329 (1971); see generally L. KANOwrrZ, WOMEN AND
THE LAW (1969); Pressman, The Legal Revolution in Women's Employment Rights, March 6,
1970, CCH EMPL. PRAC. GuDE 1 5034 at 3690-92 (1971).
22 In re Lockwood, 154 U.S. 116 (1894).
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the protective law restricting the hours of women in the landmark case of Muller
v. Oregon in 1908.2'
Before deciding Muller, the Supreme Court encountered protective laws
that did not distinguish between the sexes. In 1898 Holden v. Hardy4 upheld the
states' police power to limit the hours of workers in underground mines against
an equal protection argument. This case was limited to its facts in 1905 by
Lochner v. New York,25 which invalidated a New York statute limiting the hours
of bakery workers. The Lochner Court held that liberty of contract, i.e., "the
right of the individual to labor for such time as he may choose," 2 outweighed the
tenuous state interest in exercising its police power to protect the public and the
employee's health.
Muller v. Oregon" is the Supreme Court's most important case on female
protective laws. At that time nineteen states imposed some type of restrictions on
the hours a woman could labor." The Oregon statute prohibited women from
working more than ten hours per day in a "mechanical establishment, or factory,
or laundry."2 9 Having required a woman to work in excess of ten hours, the
defendant employer was convicted and fined $10.00.'0 He contended in the
Supreme Court that:
1. Since the statute prevents persons from making their own contracts,
it violates the privileges and immunities, the due process and the equal
protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment.
2. Since the statute does not apply equally to all persons similarly situated, it is invalid as class legislation.
3. Since there is no necessary or reasonable connection between the statute and the public health, safety and welfare, the statute is not a valid
exercise of the police power. 1
The Court's opinion did not address each argument separately. It held that
liberty of contract is not absolute and may, in certain cases, be restricted by the
states." After taking cognizance of matters of general knowledge, i.e., that women are inferior to men, the Court stated that some legislation appears necessary
to protect their rights. "Differentiated. . . from the other sex, she is properly
placed in a class by herself, and legislation designed for her protection may be
sustained, even when like legislation is not necessary for men, and could not be
sustained." 3
Thus, since such legislation protects the health of women (and
23 208 U.S. 412 (1908).
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32

33

169 U.S. 366 (1898).
198 U.S. 45, 54-55 (1905).
Id. at 54.
208 U.S. 412 (1908).
Id. at 419 n.1, citing appellee's brief (the famous "Brandeis Brief").
Id. at 416.
Id. at 417.
Id. at 417-18.
Id. at 421, citing, inter alia, Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).

Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 422 (1908).

NOTRE DAME LAWYER

[February, 1972]

of the race in general, since healthy women bear healthy offspring), it is a valid
exercise of the state's police power. Later cases have noted that Muller's main
theme is the validity of these statutes under the due process clause. 4 More important, the Court's statements in Muller on the inferior status of women may support the rationale that the statute was valid under the equal protection clause.35
0 with its theory that the
Muller v. Oregon,"
states have a special interest in
protecting this separate, but unequal, class, was the basis for the Supreme Court's
upholding of protective laws in later years (under the due process clause); e.g.,
a Massachusetts statute limiting the hours a woman could work in a factory;"
a similar Ohio statute;3" a California law limiting the hours of female workers in
factories, hotels and restaurants 9 and an amendment to the California statute to
cover hospitals and places of amusement;4" a New York statute regulating the
time of day a woman could work in a restaurant; 4 ' and a Washington statute
creating a minimum wage for women.'
The same theory is found in many state court decisions.43 However, in
1947 the Supreme Court of Florida, sitting en banc, unanimously held contra,
declaring a Miami ordinance prohibiting women bartenders invalid as an unreasonable exercise of the police power. 4 The court so held without discussion
of the Muller line and its rationale. Indeed, the court did not discuss the issue
at all, apparently feeling the conclusion it reached to be obvious.
This case might have served as a basis to reverse the trend of Muller. In
1948, however, the Muller principle that the due process clause does not forbid
a state's disparate treatment of the sexes was extended to specifically embrace
the equal protection clause. In Goesaert v. Cleary,4" the Supreme Court affirmed
under the equal protection clause the validity of a Michigan statute prohibiting
the licensing of women bartenders except for the wife or daughter of the male

34 Mengelkoch v. Indus. Welfare Comm'n, CCH EMPL. PRAc. GumE, 3 EPD [hereinafter
cited OCH EPD] 1 8097 at 6272 (9th Cir. Jan. 11, 1971); see also Brown et al., The Equal
Rights Amendment: A Constitutional Basis for Equal Rights for Women, 80 YALE L.J. 871, 877

(1971).
35 See La Fleur v. Cleveland Bd. of Educ., 326 F. Supp. 1208, 1212 (N.D. Ohio 1971),
discussed in text accompanying notes 269-73, infra; Richards v. Griffith Rubber Mills, 300 F.
Supp. 338, 340 (D. Ore. 1969), discussed in text accompanying notes 142-44, infra.
36 208 U.S. 412 (1908).
37 Riley v. Massachusetts, 232 U.S. 671 (1914).
38 Hawley v. Walker, 232 U.S. 718 (1914).
39 Miller v. Wilson, 236 U.S. 373 (1915). This case also involved an equal protection
issue, but it was limited to the argument that women in certain industries are treated differently
from women in other industries.
40 Bosley v. McLaughlin, 236 U.S. 385 (1915). This case involved an equal protection
issue similar to that raised in Miller, supra note 39.
41 Radice v. New York, 264 U.S. 292 (1924).
This case involved an equal protection
issue similar to that raised in Miller, supra note 39.
42 West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
43 See Fitzpatrick v. Liquor Control Comm'n, 316 Mich. 83, 25 N.W.2d 118 (1946); Nelson v. State ex rel. Gross, 157 Fla. 412, 26 So. 2d 60 (1946); People v. Jemnez, 49 Cal. App.
2d 739, 121 P.2d 543 (1942); Mayor and Council of Hoboken v. Goodman, 68 N.J.L. 217,
51 A. 1092 (1902).
44 Brown v. Foley, 158 Fla. 734, 29 So. 2d 870 (1947), distinguishing Nelson v. State
ex rel. Gross, 157 Fla. 412, 26 So. 2d 60 (1946), on the basis that the party aggrieved was
a female rather than an employer.
45 335 U.S. 464 (1964).
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owner of the bar. Although it did not cite Muller,4 the Court opined:
Michigan could, beyond question, forbid all women from working behind a
bar. This is so despite the vast changes in the social and legal position of
women. The fact that women may now have achieved the virtues that men
have long claimed as their prerogatives and now indulge in vices that men
have long practiced, does not preclude the States from drawing a sharp line
the sexes, certainly in such matters as the regulation of the liquor
between
47
traffic.

Thus, Muller and Goesaert provided the general principle that state protective
legislation is valid under both the due process and the equal protection clauses.
While this principle is widely considered Victorian today,48 the Supreme Court
has not expressly abandoned it to date.49 Indeed, four federal courts have recently relied on Muller and Goesaert.0 These and several state court decisions"
46

The Court stated:
It would be an idle parade of familiar learning to review the multitudinous cases
in which the constitutional assurance of the equal protection of the laws has been
applied. The generalities on this subject are not in dispute; their application turns
peculiarly on the particular circumstances of a case. Id. at 467.
47 Id. at 465-66.
48 Michigan repealed this statute in 1955. No. 206, Mich. Pub. Acts of 1955. See also
Mengelkoch v. Indus. Welfare Comm'n, 3 COH EPD 8097 (9th Cir. Jan. 11, 1971); Paterson Tavern & Grill Owners Ass'n v. Borough of Hawthorne, 57 N.J. 180, 270 A. 2d 628, 63031(1970); 110 CoNo. REQ. 2580 (1964) (remarks of Representative Griffiths):
In the most vulgar and insulting of decisions handed down in this century by the
Supreme Court, notable for its lack of legal learning as well as for its arrogant prejudice, the majority of the Supreme Court decided that it was well within the police
powers of the State of Michigan for the legislature to draw the most arbitrary and
capricious of lines as to who could tend bar in Michigan.
49 However, the Supreme Court has recently held that an Idaho statute mandating that
males be given preference to females in appointing estate administrators is invalid under the
equal protection clause since it creates an arbitrary dassification. Reed v. Reed, 40 U.S.L.W.
4013 (U.S. Nov. 22, 1971), discussed at text accompanying notes 314-21, infra. The Supreme
Court has also made a recent statement which may help to reverse the Muller trend in Griggs
v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, (1971). The Court noted that the EEOC Guidelines "are
entitled to great deference." Id. at 434. Accord, Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. Co., 408 F.2d
228, 235 (5th Cir. 1969). See also Richards v. Griffith Rubber Mills, 300 F. Supp. 338, 340
(D. Ore. 1969). However, as a practical matter, a court may still disregard an administrative
interpretation if it is so inclined; e.g., Rosenfeld v. Southern Pacific Co., 293 F. Supp. 1219,
1224 '(C.D. Cal. 1968), affdr-F.2d-(9th Cir. 1971), discussed at text accompanying note
134, infra, on the former EEOC Guideline.
50 La Fleur v. Cleveland Bd. of Educ., 326 F. Supp. 1208 (N.D. Ohio 1971); Krauss v.
Sacramento Inn, 314 F. Supp. 171, 177 (E.D. Cal. 1970); but cf. discussion in text accompanying notes 244, infra. Mengelkoch v. Indus. Welfare Comm'n, 284 F. Supp. 950, 955
(C.D. Cal. 1968):
Plaintiffs have not distinguished the issue presented from the one presented in
Muller v. Oregon, supra. The principle of stare decisis must ultimately control the
decision at the district court level. A Supreme Court decision is as binding as statutory law. The district court, even sitting as a three-judge tribunal, cannot reverse
the Supreme Court. When the law has developed through intervening decisions to the
point that it has become clear that the Supreme Court has abandoned the reasoning
which gave rise to an earlier decision and that the law has in fact changed and all
that is needed is recognition, then an inferior court should recognize what is obvious
and act accordingly. However, there has been no line of decisions which cast doubt
upon the basic holding of Muller. Therefore, this case does not present a substantial
constitutional issue. Mere speculation as to what the Supreme Court might do in
the light of the changed circumstances will not suffice to take this issue out of the
insubstantial category. Id. at 955.
51 See McCrimmon v. Daley, 418 F. 2d 366 '(7th Cir. 1969), where the Seventh Circuit
remanded a similar (unreported) dismissal for further consideration; Hargens v. Alcoholic
Bev. Control Bd., 263 Cal. App. 2d 601, 69 Cal. Rptr. 868 (1968); State v. Burke, 79 Idaho

NOTRE DAME LAWYER

[February, 1972]

are illustrative of how settled this principle is, or was, until recently.52
Against this background, let us now examine the recent legislative, administrative and judicial activity in this area.
III.

Analysis of Title VII and the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission's Position
A. Title VII

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was signed into law on July 24,
1964, and became effective one year later.53 Section 703 (a) states the basic substantive law for employers:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise
to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees in any way which would
deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or
otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. 54
This law applies to employers (except governmental units" and religious and
educational institutions5") of twenty-five or more employees.5 7 Similar provisions
cover labor organizations with twenty-five or more members,5 and employment
agencies.5"
In short, then, employment discrimination based on an individual's race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin is generally prohibited. No exceptions are
provided for discrimination based on race or color. However, a specific exception permits discrimination where sex, religion or national origin is a bona fide
occupational qualification [hereafter b.f.o.q.] reasonably necessary to the normal
operation of an employer's business.6" While not always so, it is now fairly well
205, 312 P.2d 806 (1957) ; State v. Hunter, 208 Ore. 282, 300 P.2d 455 (1956) ; Guill v. City
of Hoboken, 21 N.J. 574, 122 A.2d 881 (1956); Henson v. City of Chicago, 415 Ill. 564, 114
N.E.2d 778 (1953); Anderson v. City of St. Paul, 226 Minn. 186, 32 N.W.2d 538 (1948). Cf.
Berg, Title VII: A Three-Years' View, 44 NOTRE DAME LAWYER 311, 344 (1969), where an
expert in this field expressed doubt in early 1969 that women might receive much help in attaining civil rights from a predominantly male federal bench.
52 See Section IV, infra.
53 78 Stat. 253, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1964).
54 78 Stat. 255, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) & (2) (1964).
55 78 Stat. 253, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1964).
56 78 Stat. 255, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1 (1964).
57 78 Stat. 253, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1964).
58 78 Stat. 254, 255-56, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(e); § 2000e-2(c) (1964).
59 78 Stat. 255, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(b) (1964).
60 78 Stat. 256, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (1964) provides in pertinent part:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this title, (1) it shall not be an unlawful
employment practice for an employer to hire and employ employees ... on the basis
of his religion, sex, or national origin in those certain instances where religion, sex,
or national origin is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to
the normal operation of that particular business or enterprise ...
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settled that this exception must be strictly construed " and may be allowed only
after the employer presents sufficient evidence to warrant its application. 2
In enacting the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Congress did not intend to preempt
all state laws. The general antipreemption section of the Act provides:
Nothing contained in any title of this Act shall be construed as indicating
an intent on the part of Congress to occupy the field in which any such title
operates to the exclusion of State laws on the same subject matter, nor shall
any provision of this Act be construed as invalidating any provision of State
law unless such provision is inconsistent
with any of the purposes of this
83
Act, or any provision thereof.
Neither did Congress intend to sanction compliance with any state law which
would result in an unlawful employment practice. The specific antipreemption
section of Title VII, Section 708, provides:
Nothing in this title shall be deemed to exempt or relieve any person from
any liability, duty, penalty, or punishment provided by any present or future
law of any State or political subdivision of a State, other than any such law
which purports to require or permit the doing of any act which would be
an unlawful employment practice under this title. 4
By its terms, by its timing," ' and by its legislative history, 6 this section does not
expressly mean to preserve state protective laws. However, the legislative history
surrounding the addition of the sex discrimination prohibition is not conclusive
as to whether Congress specifically intended to repeal state protective legislation.
Congressman Celler first raised the issue:
Would the many State and local provisions regulating working conditions
and hours of employment for women be struck down?
You know the biological differences between the sexes. In many States
we have laws favorable to women. Are you going to strike those laws down?
This is the entering wedge, an amendment of this sort. The67list of foreseeable consequences, I will say to the committee, is unlimited.
Representative Griffiths took a strong stand that such laws ought be stricken,
since "[m]ost of the so-called protective legislation has really been to protect men's
rights in better paying jobs."6 " Representative St. George implied the same when
61 29 C.F.R. § 1604.1(a) (1970).
62 See Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542 (1971); Diaz v. Pan American
World Airways, Inc., 4-42 F.2d 385, 387 (5th Cir. 1971); Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel.
Co., 408 F.2d 228, 235 (5th Cir. 1969).
63 78 Stat. 268, 42 U.S.C. § 2000h-4 (1964).
64 78 Stat. 262, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-7 (1964).
65 Section 708 was in the bill before sex was added. Note, supra note 2, at 1191 n.115:
"The Bill as originally described in a House report appearing in November, 1963, ocntained
[sic] an antipreemption section. H.R. RFP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1963). Sex was
added to the Act on Feb. 8, 1964. 110 Cong. Rec. 2577 (1964)."
66 Section 708 was added to preserve the validity of state fair employment laws. 110
CoNo. Rac. 7243 (1964) (remarks of Senator Case); 110 CoNo. Rxc. 12,721 (1964) (remarks of Senator Humphrey).
67 110 CoNa. Rac. 2577-78 (1964).
68 Id. at 2580.
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she noted that "... women do not get equal pay for equal work.""9 Even one
opponent to the amendment expressed concern that protective laws "may be
repealed by implication."7
However, one proponent felt "sure the acceptance
of the amendment will not repeal the protective laws of the several States."71
While the House debate has been read by some to evidence congressional intent
to supersede state protective laws, 2 such an intent was not clearly expressed.
The prohibition against sex discrimination was added to the Bill at the
eleventh hour by the House,7 and without the benefit of a committee report or a
complete debate on this issue. 4 Indeed, the sponsor of the sex amendment was
the leader of the House opposition to the Act, who apparently hoped that the
amendment would gain opposition to the Act," or, alternatively, if the Act were
passed, that white females would not be placed in a position inferior to black
women.
In short, then,
The sex amendment consisted of inserting the word "sex" in appropriate
places in the bill. It was introduced without the benefit of further explanation or committee consideration. Many of the members voting on the
amendment had not been present for the immediately preceding debate.
Accordingly, it seems unrealistic to speak of an intent of Congress in the
sense of an actual consensus among the supporters of the amendment that
it would accomplish any particular result not plainly inferable7from the language of the amendment and the logic of the title as a whole.
B. Administrative Interpretation
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission has the responsibility for
administering the Civil Rights Act of 1964.78 For various reasons, the Commission took no immediate position on the validity of state protective laws. Its former
Acting General Counsel felt it "was difficult, from a legal point of view, to assume that Congress intended to overthrow the laws and regulations of over forty
states."7
Moreover, the Commission found disagreement among female civil
rights groups on this issue. Women covered by a collective bargaining agreement
69 Id.
70 Id. at 2732 (remarks of Representative Multer).
71 Id. at 2583 (remarks of Representative Kelly).
72 Rosenfeld v. Southern Pacific Co., F.2d (9th Cir. 1971); Murray and Eastwood, supra note 4, at 248-49.
73 House Report No. 914, supra note 2, stated that the purpose of the Legislation, in part,
was to "eliminate . . . discrimination in employment based on race, color, religion, or national origin." 1964 U.S. CODE CONG. AND ADm. NEws, p. 2401. Sex was added to the bill
on February 8, 1964. 110 CoNG. REc. 2577 (1964) (remarks of Representative Smith). For
a concise history of the addition of sex see Miller, Sex Discrimination and Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 51 MINN. L. Rxv. 877, 879-83 (1967).
For the legislative history
of Title VII in general see Vaas, Title VII: Legislative History, 7 B.C. IND. & Com. L. Rav.
431 (1966).
74 Miller, supra note 73, at 879-83. Virtually no debate transpired in the Senate either.
Id. at 882-83.
75 Id. at 833 n.34.
76 110 CONG. REc. 2583 (1964) (remarks of Representatives Andrews, Rivers, and Smith);
id. at 2584 (remarks of Representative Gathings).
77 Berg, supra note 51, at 332 n.117. Accord, Miller, supra note 73, at 883-84.
78 78 Stat. 258-59, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4'(1964).
79 Berg, supra note 51, at 333.
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or by the Fair Labor Standards Act 0 looked at such laws as discriminatory, while
women not so situated desired their protective features. 8
After receiving no response to its invitation to Congress to clarify its intention, 2 the EEOC issued Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex in November of 1965. These first Guidelines stated, in pertinent part:
(C) The Commission does not believe that Congress intended to disturb
such laws and regulations which are intended to, and have the effect of,
protecting women against exploitation and hazard. Accordingly, the Commission will consider limitations or prohibitions imposed by such state laws
or regulations as a basis for application of the bona fide occupational qualification exception. However, in cases where the clear effect of a law in current circumstances is not to protect women but to subject them to discrimination, the law will not be considered a justification for discrimination. So,
for example, restrictions on lifting weights will not be deemed in conflict
with Title VII except where the limit
is set at an unreasonably low level
83
which could not endanger women.
Thus, the Commission initially felt that the b.f.o.q. section of the Act8 4 could
reconcile the paradox on a flexible, case by case basis. However, in the three
years following this Guideline, the Commission never issued an opinion that a
particular state law was invalid. 5 A former Acting General Counsel of the
EEOC explains:
Fairness to the Commission, however, requires recognition of the fact
that the circumstances required it to take some public position at a time
when neither the Commission itself nor those it consulted had sufficient
knowledge or expertise to resolve the difficult legal and policy questions that
it confronted. Therefore, it had to buy time by adopting a position that
would postpone the most difficult questions, and this the guideline certainly
did. Furthermore, the Commission had hoped that the call for state legislative action would bring some response, especially where it was coupled with
the threat that arbitrary and outdated legislation might be set aside in later
actions by the Commission and the courts. Finally, the guideline did provide
that where state laws or regulations permitted administrative exceptions, an
employer could not justify discrimination as compelled by state law unless
he had sought in good faith to obtain an exception. Thus, the Commission
intended to resolve those cases capable of solution within the existing legal
framework, and to generate more pressure for flexibility on the authorities
administering state laws. [Footnotes omitted.]86
The EEOC was also not unmindful of the problem a more definitive position
would have created for employers, since such a position could not force the states
80 52 Stat. 1060 (1938), 29 U.S.C. § 201 (1964).
81 Berg, supra note 51, at 333, citing White House Conference on Equal Employment
Opportunity, 59 L.R.R.M. 88 (1965).
82 Hearings on H.R. 8998 and H.R. 8999 Before a Subcomm. of the House Educ. and
Labor Comm., 89th Cong, 1st Sess. at 105 (1965).
83 30 FED. REG. 14926, 27 (1965).
84 78 Stat 256 (1964), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) '(1970).
85 Berg, supra note 51, at 334.
86 Id. at 334-35.
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to refrain from enforcing their protective laws.87 Since blanket repeal by the
states or further action by Congress was unlikely, the Commission came to realize
that the only effective resolution of the issue would be litigation. Thus, in 1966
it issued a policy statement that, in the event of a seemingly unresolvable conflict
between federal and state law, the EEOC would make no determination of reasonable cause, but would merely advise the charging party of her right to secure
a judicial determination thereof. The Commission also gave notice that it might
appear as amicus curiae to present its views on the proper construction of Title
VII.88 Some litigation followed this policy statement, one court holding a
Georgia weight-lifting restriction valid (this decision was subsequently reversed
in 1969)."
In early 1968, the EEOC retracted the 1966 policy statement, referring to
its original 1965 Guideline. The Commission stated that it intended to process
such cases to a conclusion and rule on whether the state law had been nullified
by Title VII °
The first case holding a protective law invalid because of Title VII was decided in November of 1968.1 The Commission had appeared as amicus curiae
and urged the result. After additional judicial authority to the same effect,"2
the Commission decided that the adoption of a firm position would be appropriate. The present Guideline was published on August 19, 1969:
(b) (1) Many States have enacted laws or promulgated administrative
regulations with respect to the employment of females. Among these laws
are those which prohibit or limit the employment of females, e.g., the employment of females in certain occupations, in jobs requiring the lifting or
carrying of weights exceeding certain prescribed limits, during certain hours
of the night, or for more than a specified number of hours per day or per
week.
(2) The Commission believes that such State laws and regulations, although originally promulgated for the purpose of protecting females, have
ceased to be relevant to our technology or to the expanding role of the female
worker in our economy. The Commission has found that such laws and regulations do not take into account the capacities, preferences, and abilities of
individual females and tend to discriminate rather than protect. Accordingly, the Commission has concluded that such laws and regulations conflict
with Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and will not be considered a
defense to an otherwise established unlawful employment practice or as a
basis for the application of the bona fide occupational qualification exception.92
87 Id. at 335.
88 CCH EMPL. PRAC. GUIDE
16,900.001 (1968).
89 Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 277 F. Supp. 117 (S.D. Ga. 1967), rev'd, 408
F.2d 228 (5th Cir. 1969); see text accompanying notes 115-127, infra. Cf. Coon v. Tingle, 277
F. Supp. 304 (N.D. Ga. 1967).
90 33 FED. REG. 3344 (1968).
91 Rosenfeld v. Southern Pacific Co., 293 F. Supp. 1219 (C.D. Cal. 1968), aff'd,
F. 2d
(9th Cir. 1971).
92 Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711 (7th Cir. 1969) (dictum); Weeks v.
Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228 (5th Cir. 1969) (dictum); Richards v. Griffith
Rubber Mills, 300 F. Supp. 338 (D. Ore. 1969); but see Ward v. Luttrell, 292 F. Supp. 162,
292 F. Supp. 165 (E.D. La. 1968).
93 29 C.F.R. § 1604 1 (b) (1970); 34 FED. REG. 13367-68 (1969).
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Since the promulgation of this Guideline, the EEOC has consistently found state
protective laws invalid in individual cases."" (The United States Department of
Labor's Office of Federal Contract Compliance has also issued Guidelines, effective June 9, 1970, which prohibit a government contractor from denying a woman a job she is qualified to perform on the basis of a state protective law. 5 )
IV. A Survey of Recent Developments in the Law
A. Recent Legislative and Administrative Developments
Even before Title VII was enacted, Indiana repealed its hour restriction for
women." Since the enactment of Title VII, nine states have followed suitY
Two of these, Delaware and Nebraska, went one step further and repealed their
laws providing benefits for women. 8 Other states have severely modified their
hour restrictions; e.g., New York's hour and shift law99 now governs only women
under twenty-one years of age; a few states' hour restrictions'0 0 now exempt
women employees covered by the Fair Labor Standards Act; and Texas' law
is now conditioned upon the employee's consent. 1 '
Other states have recently amended their Fair Employment Practices Acts
to include a ban on sex discrimination.10 2 This recent legislative action could be
reasonably construed to have impliedly repealed these states' protective laws.
94

Comm'n Decision No. 71-1062, Dec. 30, 1970, CCH

EMPL.

PRAO. GumE

1 6196 (Wash-

ington hour and weight statute); Comm'n Decision No. 71-963, Dec. 23, 1970, CCH EMPL.

PRAc. GumE
6192 (Oregon hour statute); Comm'n Decision No: 71-351, Oct. 13, 1970,
CCH EMPL. PRac. Gum
6171 (N.J. hour statute); Comn'n Decision No. 71-77, July 17,
1970, CCH EMPL. PRc. GunDE 6161 (City resolution forbidding female card dealers in a
casino); Comm'n Decision No. 70-424. .Jan. 19, 1970, CCHE PaWL.PRAc. GuIDE f 6104 (Ohio
weight and hour statutes); Comm'n Decision No. 70-382, Dec. 16, 1969, CCH EMPL. PRAC.

GumE

6091 (D.C. hour law impliedly repealed by Title VII).

Accord, Opinion of Corp.

Counsel, D.C., March 25, 1970, CCH EaWL. PRAc. GuIDE 5043.
95 41 C.F.R. § 60-20.3(f) (1971); see also 36 FED. REG. 17444'(1971) (proposed affiative action plan for females).
96 Ch. 68, § 1 [1933] Ind. Acts 435, repealed by ch. 51, § 1, [1959] Ind. Acts 119.
97 Amuz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 23-281, repealed by ch. 69, § 1 [19701 Ariz. Laws; COLO. Rsv.
STAT. ANN. §§ 80-14-9, -10, -11 (1963), repealed by ch. 223, § 1, [1971] Colo. Laws 898; DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 19, §§ 301-35 (1953), repealed by ch. 218, [19651 Del. Laws 618; MAss. GEN.

LAws ch. 149, §§ 53-105 (1965), suspended pro temp. by ch. 41 [1971] Mass. Laws I Adv.
Leg. Serv. 15; MicH. Comp. LAws ANN. §§ 408.51 to 408.94 (1967), repealed by Nos. 187
and 282, § 18, [1967] Mich. Acts 248, 579; MONT. REV. CODE ANN. § 41-1118 (1961), repealed by ch. 151, § 2 [1971] Mont. Laws; NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 48-201 to 48-208, repealed by ch.
398, § 1, [19691 Neb. Laws 1388; N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 34:2-24 to 34:2-28.2, repealed by ch.
186, § 1 [1971] N.J. Sess. Law Serv. 748: VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §§ 440-41 (1967), as
amended, No. 218, §§ 1-2 [19691 Vt. Acts Adj. Sess. 137 (deleted reference to women).
98 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19 §§ 301-35 '(1953), repealed by ch. 218, [1965] Del. Laws 618;
NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 48-201 to 48-208, repealed by ch. 398, § 1 [1969] Neb. Laws 1388.
99 N.Y. LABOR LAw § 173 (McKinney Supp. 1970-71).
100 ARK. STAT. ANN. § 81-601 (1960); Ms. ANN. CODE art. 100, § 52 (Supp. 1971); VA.
CODE ANN. § 40.1-36(a) (1970).
101 Tax. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. § 5172a(1) (1971), as amended, ch. 473, 31 [1971] Vernon's
Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 1671.
102 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, §§ 710-18 (Supp. 1971); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 48, § 853
(Smith-Hurd 1966), as amended, No. 77-1342, § 3 [1971] Ill. Leg. Serv. 2107-08; IowA CODE
ANN. § 105A.7(1) (Supp. 1971); R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. §§ 28-5.1 to 28-5.39 (Supp. 1971);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 363.03 (Supp. 1971); MONT. REv. CODE ANN. §§ 64-301 to 64-303
(Supp. 1971); WASH. R . CODE ANN. tit. 49, §§ 49.60.010 to 49.60.330, as amended, ch.
81X, §§ 1-16 [1971] Wash. Leg. Serv. 436-37; Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 27-261 (1967).
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Three state courts have so held."'3 The Arizona Civil Rights Commission' and
the Attorney General of Pennsylvania °5 have made similar rulings. It should
be noted, however, that many of these laws specifically provide that they are
not intended to disturb the state's protective legislation;... others have been so
The Attorneys General of several states have issued opinions to
interpreted.'
the effect that their states' protective legislation is invalid in light of Title VII' s
One, however, added a reservation that employers should not ignore such laws
without regard for the employee's health. 0 9 Furthermore, some of these opinions
have indicated that the state protective legislation still applies to employers not
covered by the federal law."'
The Washington State Human Rights Commissions has recently ruled that
it will generally follow interpretations under Title VII, in particular the EEOC
Guidelines. However, it also stated that it will not follow federal precedents
where it believes a different interpretation will better carry out the purposes of
the state law.""a
The foregoing developments, when coupled with the recent decisions in this
area, certainly indicate a trend toward invalidating state protective laws. However, the recent actions of some states indicate that traditional concepts about
the "weaker sex" are not entirely dead. For example, several states have recently amended their protective laws."' While these amendments have generally
restricted their application, that they were not entirely repealed when the legislature was on the subject indicates some continued interest in the working condi103 City of Milwaukee v. Wis. Dep't of Indus., Labor & Human Relations, 3 CCH EPD
8125 (Wis. Cir. Ct. Feb. 24, 1971); Jarosak v. City of Minneapolis, [June, 1969 - Oct., 1970,
9457 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Nov. 18, 1969); Longacre v. State,
Transfer Binder] 63 Labor Cases
448 P.2d 832 '(Wyo. 1968).
104 Reynolds v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., [July, 1965-July, 1968, Transfer Binder]
8111 (Dec. 2, 1966).
CCH LABOR LAW RPTR., EMPL. PRAC.
105 Pa. Atty. Gen. Op., Nov. 14, 1969, CCH EMPL. PRAC. GUIDE %5106.
9
106
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-126a (Supp. 1971-72); MAss. ANN. LAW ch. 151B,
(Supp. 1970); MIcH. ComP. LAWS § 423.303a (1967); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 296.020(8) (Supp.
1970-71); NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-1124 (1968); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 25, § 1311 (Supp. 197172).
107 N.Y.S. State Comm. for Human Rights, Rulings Interpreting "Sex" Provisions (no
date), CCH EMPL. PRAC. GUIDE 26,053(D) (1) (C); Utah Ind. Comm., Anti-Discrimination
Division Sex Discrimination Guidelines, Sept. 19, 1966, CCH EMPL. PRAc. GUIDE 28,120 (4)5101.
(1) (b); Wis. Atty. Gen. Op., July 27, 1970, CCH EMPL. PRAC. GUIDE
108 Ill. Atty. Gen. Op., File No. NP-227, Oct. 2, 1970, CCH EMPL. PRAC. GUIDE 1 5134;
Mich. Atty. Gen. Op. No. 4687, Dec. 30, 1969, CCH EMPL. PRAc. GUmE %5108; Okla. Atty.
Gen. Op., No. 69-304, Dec. 5, 1969, CCH EMPL. PRAC. GUIDE %5105; S.D. Atty. Gen. Op.,
1219.441; Wash. Atty. Gen. Op. No. 9, May 26,
Feb. 27, 1969, CCH EMPL. PRAc. GUIDE
1970, CCH EMPL. PRAc. GUIDE 1 5073; Wis. Atty. Gen. Op., July 27, 1970, CCH EMPL. PRAO.
5101.
GUIDE
1219.384.
109 N.D. Atty. Gen. Op., April 18, 1969, CCH EMPL. PRAc. GUIDE
110 Ill. Atty. Gen. Op., File No. NP-227, Oct. 2, 1970, CCH EsPL. PRAC. GUIDE fI 5134;
Mich. Atty. Gen. Op. No. 4687, Dec. 30, 1969, CCH EMPL. PRAc. GUIDE fI 5108; Wash. Atty.
5073; Wis. Atty. Gen. Op., July
Gen. Op. No. 9, May 26, 1970, CCH EMPL. PRAC. GUIDE
27, 1970, CCH EMPL. PRAc. GUIDE 5101.
ll0a WASH. ADMiN. CODE § 162-30-010 (1971), CCH EMPL. PRAc. GUIDE %28,574.
111 E.g., COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 92-10-2 (1970), (no women in mines), as amended, ch.
253, § 1 [1971] Colo. Laws 1043; CAL. LABOR CODE § 1350.5(a)-(d) (West 1971), as amended,
ch. 457, § 11 1971] West Cal. Leg. Serv. 845 (women in airline and railroad industries); N.Y.
LABOR LAW § 173 (McKinney Supp. 1970-71) (hour and shift restrictions now apply only to
women under 21 years old); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 59-5-1 (Supp. 1971) (hours); TEx. REV. CIV.
STAT. ANN. art. 5172a(1) (1971), as amended, ch. 473, § 1 [1971] Vernon's Tex. Sess. Law.
Serv. 1671 (hour law conditioned on employee's consent); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 103.02 (Supp.
1971-72) (women may not work in conditions dangerous to health).
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tions of women employees by the states. The Attorney General of Kentucky has
taken the stand that, despite the recent trend, the state's protective legislation will
remain in effect until the United States Supreme Court holds otherwise."' 2 The
North Carolina Commissioner of Labor has taken a similar stand.""
As noted above, several other Attorneys General have stated that their
"protective" state laws still apply to employers not covered by Title VII. The
Ohio Department of Industrial Relations stated on September 4, 1969, that it
would not prosecute alleged violations of Ohio's protective laws. However, one
year later it reversed this opinion, noting that the legislature's inaction during the
1 4
interregnum mandated continued enforcement.
In short, then, the modern trend toward invalidating state protective laws
has not developed into a nationwide repeal of such laws, nor is such a result
probable.
B. Recent JudicialDevelopments
This section will survey the many cases decided in recent years relevant to
state protective laws, emphasizing the different legal theories employed to attack
such laws. The cases are organized according to the types of legislation at issue.
However, theories applicable to one type may also be applicable to another type.
Section V will summarize and analyze the different theories contained in the
following cases.
1. LITIGATION INVOLVING RESTRICTIVE LEGISLATION
Most of the recent decisions address statutes restricting the einployment of
women in certain occupations.
Weeks v. Southern Bell Telephone and Telegraph Company, decided at
the district court level on November 9, 1967,"1 was the firsf case to pass on the
validity of a State protective law under the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Plaintiff
alleged that a Georgia regulation limiting the amount of weight a woman could
lift to 30 pounds was invalid, since it denied her an opportunity for a better employment position. The court phrased the issue in terms of whether the regulation created a b.f.o.q., finding nothing in the Civil Rights Act "to indicate that
Congress intended to nullify or limit the application of such laws or regulations.""' While the court's statement is not entirely correct," 7 it did properly find
support in the then current EEOC Guidelines, which specifically stated that
reasonable weight restrictions establish a b.f.o.q."' Thus, the court held: (1) the
112
113
N.C.
as of
114
115
116
117

Ky. Atty. Gen. Op., June 26, 1969, CCH EmPL. PRAc. Guma 5079.
N.C. Comm'r of Labor Op., Nov. 25, 1969, CCH ErMpL. PRAc. Guma, 1 5111; but cf.
GEN. STAT. § 126.16 (Supp. 1971) (sex discrimination in public employment prohibited
July 12, 1971).
CCH EMPL. PRAc. Gum,, 5129.
277 F. Supp. 117 (S.D. Ga. 1967), rev'd, 408 F.2d 228 (5th Cir. 1969).
Id. at 118.
See 78 Stat. 262 (1964), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-7 (1964) and text accompanying notes 67-

77, supra.
118 29 C.F.R. § 1604.1(c) (1967).
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regulation was valid on this basis, and (2) that, apart from the regulation, the
nature of the position created a b.f.o.q."'
Pending appeal to the Fifth Circuit, Georgia amended its regulation to prohibit the lifting of weights by either gender that might cause strains or undue
fatigue. 12 As a result, the Fifth Circuit stated that "the issue of protective state
legislation disappears from the case."'' The court did, however, disapprove of
the reasoning of the district court. It first stated that Congress intended the
b.f.o.q. section to be narrowly construed 12 and that the EEOC Guidelines so
construe it.'2 ' The court then cited the specific Guidelines relied on by the district court (that reasonable weight restrictions will be honored), but noted that
plaintiff contended the 30-pound limit was unreasonable and ineffectual, and
violated the due process and supremacy clauses. On this point, the court cited
the first case invalidating a state weight restriction for women because of a conflict with Title VII 2 4 Without expressly approving or disapproving that case,
the court cited it to demonstrate that the Commission appeared therein as amicus
curiae and urged the ultimate result.'
This appearance indicated that the
Commission gave a stricter interpretation to its Guideline on weight restrictions
than the district court supposed.
The Fifth Circuit next proceeded to expressly reverse the district court's second holding, concluding that the employer had a heavy burden of proof in order
to have a restrictive policy held valid as a b.f.o.q. Stereotyped characterizations
about women in general were not sufficient. 2 1 This decision is clearly a landmark for this principle. It is not clear, however, that Weeks stands for the proposition that state protective laws are generally invalid under Title VII. Nevertheless, such a conclusion has been suggested. 7
In Ward v.Luttell,28 decided on October 4, 1968, plaintiffs brought a class
action (representing all female workers in Louisiana) alleging every Louisiana
protective law.. invalid under the due process, equal protection and supremacy
clauses. A three-judge court dismissed the first two arguments as insubstantial
in light of Muller v. Oregon"' and remanded the third to the single judge."'
The single judge never reached the merits, dismissing the case partially on the

119 Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 277 F. Supp. 117, 119 (S.D. Ga. 1967), rezvd,
408 F.2d 228 (5th Cir. 1969).
120 Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228, 233 (5th Cir. 1969), discussing
Ga. Comm'n of Labor Rule 59, Aug. 27, 1968.
121 Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228, 233 (5th Cir. 1969).
122 Id. at 232. The court cited the following authority in N. 3: "For an interpretative
memorandum
by Senators Clark and Chase, floor managers of the bill, suggesting that Section
703 (e) (1) creates a 'limited exception,' see 110 Cong. Rec. 7213 (1964)."
123 Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228, 232 (5th Cir. 1969), citing 29
C.F.R. § 1604.1(a) (1968).
124 Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228, 233 (5th Cir. 1969), citing
Rosenfeld v. Southern Pacific Co., 293 F. Supp. 1219 (C.D. Cal. 1968).
125 Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228, 233 (5th Cir. 1969).
126

Id. at 233-36.

127 See Potlatch Forests, Inc. v. Hays, 318 F. Supp. 1368, 1375 (E.D. Ark. 1970).
128 292 F. Supp. 162 (E.D. La. 1968).
129 LA. Rpv. STAT. ANN. §§ 23: 291-93, 23: 311-14, 23: 331-37, 23: 351-67 (1964).
130 208 U.S. 412 (1908).
131 Ward v. Luttrell, 292 F. Supp. 162, 165 (E.D. La. 1968).
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ground that plaintiffs did not adequately represent the class." 2 The court's
rationale is noteworthy:
Nor can we conceive that plaintiffs' position represents the will of many
other women workers, even if similarly situated. Removing the work hour
limitation for women would place women on an equal basis with men in the
matter of overtime pay and make available to them some, if not all, the
opportunities offered men which plaintiffs urge they are being denied. However, it would not then be just a matter of allowing women to work overtime when they choose to do so, but they would be subjected to the obligation to work more hours whether they want to or not under the penalty of
being discharged. We are not convinced that all women would want such
obligation

233

The first court holding a state protective law invalid under the supremacy
clause was the United States District Court for the Central District of California
l
in Rosenfeld v. Southern Pacific Company, decided on November 22, 1968."'
Plaintiff was denied promotion to a position that would occasionally require long
hours and the lifting of heavy weights in violation of the California Labor Code.'
The court found that the California laws did not create a b.f.o.q., that they
discriminate against women, that they violate Title VII, and that they are "void
This decision is sigand of no force and effect" under the supremacy clause."
nificant in that this is the first case so holding under Title VII and was decided
even before the present EEOC Guidelines.. were promulgated. Indeed, to the
extent that the then current Guidelines 3 were inconsistent with the court's opin(It should be noted, however, that the EEOC appeared
ion, they were void.'
as amicus curiae and urged the result reached in this case.) This case was affirmed last spring by the Ninth Circuit. 4" After his unsuccessful appeal, California's Attorney General announced that henceforth only laws that provide benefits
to women will continue to be enforced. 4
The second case holding a state protective law invalid under the supremacy

clause was Richards v. Griffith Rubber Mills, 2 decided May 5, 1969. The
plaintiff was denied a promotion to a position occasionally requiring the lifting
of heavy weights in part because of an Oregon Wage and Hour Commission
Order. The court held the Oregon law invalid under the supremacy clause be-

cause it conflicted with Title VII

43

The court also answered the argument that

132 Ward v. Luttrell, 292 F. Supp. 165, 168 (E.D. La. 1968).

133 Id.
(9th Cir. 1971).
F.2d
134 293 F. Supp. 1219 (C.D. Cal. 1968), aff'd,
135 CAL. LABOR CODE §§ 1251 and 1350 (West 1971).
136 Rosenfeld v. Southern Pacific Co., 293 F. Supp. 1219. 1224 (C.D. Cal. 1968), aff'd,
(9th Cir. 1971).
F.2d 137 29 C.F.R. § 1604.1 (1970). See text accompanying note 93, supra.
138 29 C.F.R. § 1604.1 (1969).
139 Rosenfeld v. Southern Pacific Co., 293 F. Supp., 1219, 1224 (C.D. Cal. 1968), aff'd,
-F.2d(9th Cir. 1971).
(9th Cir. 1971).
F. 2d140 141 CCH EmPL. PR.c. GumE 5176 (1971).
142 300 F. Supp. 338 (D. Ore. 1969).
143 Id. at 340, citine Gibbons v. Oqden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat. 1) 211 (1824); Rosenfeld v.
Southern Pacific Co., 293 F. Supp. 1219 (C.D. Cal. 1968).
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under the equal protection clause a state may constitutionally restrict the employment of women.
This is correct, Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 . . . (1908), but it is not

the issue. Except in rare and justifiable circumstances, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e2(e), the law no longer permits either employers or the states to deal with
women as a class in relation to employment to their disadvantage. 29
C.F.R. § 1604.1 (a) [1970]. Individuals must be judged as individuals and
not on the basis of characteristics generally attributed to racial, religious, or
sexual groups. The particular classification in Order No. 8 may be reasonable under the Equal Protection Clause, but it is no longer permitted under
the Supremacy Clause and the Equal Employment Opportunity Act. 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-7.744
Since the employer could not show its refusal to promote plaintiff was based on
a bona fide occupational qualification, it had violated Title VII in following
the state law.
Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., decided in September, 1969, passed on an
employer's self-imposed weight limitation.' 45 However, the decision declaring
the employer's policy invalid contains some relevant dictum on state protective
laws. The court agreed with the then current EEOC Guidelines 4 ' which stated
that the Commission did not believe Congress intended to disturb all protective
laws.'4 7 Nevertheless, a b.f.o.q. on weight lifting must be strictly construed and
does not mean all weight lifting statutes are valid. Rather, most current state
laws have such low limits that they are unreasonable in light of the physical
abilities of most American women. "'
It is interesting to note that, on the issue
of the employer's policy, the court held that Colgate could retain its 35-pound
restriction
for both male and female employees if it provided individual excep9
1 4

tions.

CaterpillarTractor Co. v. Grabiec5 ° involved a novel procedural situation
in that two employers (Caterpillar and Illinois Bell) took the initiative and sought
a declaratory judgment that Illinois' hour and weight restrictions' 5 ' were invalid.
The court found a justiciable controversy in which the plaintiffs had standing
because the Illinois Director of Labor was actively enforcing the state law and
that the employers were threatened with actions by their employees. 5 2 The
court then held in its conclusions of law that the Illinois statutes did not create a
b.f.o.q., that they violated Title VII, and thus were "void and of no force" under
the supremacy clause.'
In Local 246, Utility Workers Union of America v. Southern California
Edison Co., "' the employer denied a woman promotion to a position requiring
144
145
146
147
148
149
150
151
152
153
154

Richards v. Griffith Rubber Mills, 300 F. Supp. 338, 340 (D. Ore. 1969).
416 F. 2d 711 "(7th Cir. 1969).
29 C.F.R. § 1604.1(c) (1969).
Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 416 F. 2d 711, 716 (7th Cir. 1969).
Id. at 717.
Id. at 718.
317 F. Supp. 1304 (S.D. II. 1970).
ILL. STAT. ANN. Ch. 48, § 5 (Smith-Hurd 1969).
Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Grabiec, 317 F. Supp. 1304, 1306-07 (S.D. IIl. 1970).
Id. at 1307.
320 F. Supp. 1262 '(C.D. Cal. 1970).
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the lifting of 50-pound objects on a regular basis. The employer contended that
the relevant California statute 55 was valid under the antipreemption sections of
the Civil Rights Act of 196456 and that it created a b.f.o.q. under Section 703
(e) of the Act. 5 The court quickly rejected the first argument, holding that
the antipreemption sections were intended to preserve only state laws similar to
the Civil Rights Act.', 8 It then found that being a male was not a reasonably
necessary prerequisite to being able to lift 50 pounds. "On the contrary, there
are without doubt a substantial number of women who could lift over 50 pounds
and a large number of men who could not."'5 9 Upon review of the EEOC
Guidelines and other decisions on point, 6 ' the court found the California law
invalid under the supremacy clause. 6'
In Garneau v. Raytheon Co., 62 eight female employees .brought a class
action to declare the Massachusetts statute limiting the hours a woman could
work 6 . invalid under the supremacy clause, and for an injunction against its
enforcement by the Massachusetts Commissioner of the Department of Labor.
The court noted that at oral argument all parties conceded the "head-on and
irreducible conflict" between the state law and Title VII. Then, without further
discussion, it cited Gibbons u. Ogden. for the proposition that the state law
must yield to the federal, and thus granted plaintiffs the relief requested. "
In Kober v. Westinghouse Electric Corp.,'66 plaintiff sued for a declaratory
judgment that the Pennsylvania law restricting hours for women workers6' was
invalid, for an injunction against her employer from denying her a promotion in
reliance thereon, and for back pay. The court felt the injunctive relief unnecessary as, subsequent to the filing of the suit, Pennsylvania amended its Human
Relations Act to forbid employment discrimination because of sex, " the Pennsylvania Attorney General issued an opinion that the amendment impliedly repealed the labor law,'69 and defendants agreed to comply with Title VII'
(Since no party asserted the validity of the labor law, it is questionable whether
declaratory relief was necessary. However, the court felt that this would be
appropriate to give a "controlling judicial construction" of the employer's actions
under the state and federal law.)' 7 ' The court then stated its conclusion that
155 CAL. LABOR CODE § 1251 (West 1971).
156 78 Stat. 262 and 268, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000h-4 and 2000e-7 (1964).
157 78 Stat. 256. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (1964).
158 Local 46, Util. Workers Union v. Southern Cal. Edison Co., 320 F. Supp. 1262, 1264
(C.D. Cal. 1970).
159 Id. at 1265.
160 Richards v. Griffith Rubber Mills, 300 F. Supp. 338 (D. Ore. 1969); Rosenfeld v.
Southern Pac. Co., 293 F. Supp. 1219 (C.D. Cal. 1968), aff'd,
F.2d (9th Cir.
1971).
161 Local 246, Util..Workers Union v. Southern Cal. Edison Co., 320 F. Supp. 1262, 126567 (C.D. Cal. 1970).
162 323 F. Supp. 391 (D. Mass. 1971).
163 MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 149, § 56 (Supp. 1970).
164 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 211 (1824).
165 Garneau v. Raytheon Co., 323 F. Supp. 391, 393 (D. Mass. 1971).
166 325 F. Supp. 467 (W.D. Pa. 1971).
167 PA. STAT. ANN. § 103 (Supp. 1971).
168 PA. STAT. ANN. §§ 951-63 (Supp. 1971).
169 Pa. Atty. Gen. Opinion, Nov. 14, 1969, CCII EmPL. PRAc. GumDE 1I5106.
170 Kober v. Westinghouse Electric Co., 325 F. Supp. 467, 473 (W.D. Pa. 1971).
171 Id. at 472.
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2
the Pennsylvania law was invalid under the supremacy clauseY.
In Ridinger v. GeneralMotors Corp., 3 the United States District Court for
the Southern District of Ohio considered the validity of Ohio's hour and weight
restrictions 74 at the request of two women who were allegedly denied promotions
75
because of their sex. The court held that Title VII's antipreemption sections
make it clear that Congress intended to supersede all state laws which require an
act amounting to an unfair employment practice under Section 703 (a) and
(b).'"8 The court found that the state laws did not create a valid b.f.o.q., since
they were based on stereotyped characterizations rather than individual capacities.
Thus, because these laws denied women employment opportunities, they were
"void and of no force and effect" under the supremacy clause. 7
The court next felt constrained to comment upon a conflicting Ohio inter78
mediate appellate court decision on the same issue decided two weeks earlier.
This decision held the same Ohio laws valid on the theories that they created a
b.f.o.q. and that the employer could place the same restrictions on males. The
federal court euphemistically disapproved this decision, finding support for its
holding in several federal court decisions that found similar laws superseded by
Title VIIY
The employer took the initiative again in General Electric Co. V. Hughes,'
decided on May 3, 1971. General Electric sought a preliminary injunction
against the Ohio Director of Industrial Relations from enforcing Ohio's law imThe court granted the preposing hour and weight restrictions on women.'
liminary injunction pending a final hearing on the merits, 8 2 citing its earlier decision on the same statutes in Ridinger v. GeneralMotors Corp.'8 3 Had the court
stopped there, this case would not be unique. However, the case is significant
in that the court refused to grant a preliminary injunction to bar the state's investigation of complaints to determine whether any woman was required against
her will to work longer hours or lift heavier weights than permitted by state law.'
The court stated:

We find substance to the claim of the state officials that no employer
should turn the clock backward, i.e., that they should guard against employers trying to turn the situation to their advantage by forcing female
employees to work long hours and lift more than they should.8 5
172 Id. at 474.
173 325 F. Supp. 1089 '(S.D. Ohio 1971).
174 OHio REV. CODE ANN. §§ 4107.43 & 4107.46 (Page 1965).
175 78 Stat. 262 and 268, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-7 and 2000h-4 (1964).
176 Ridinger v. General Motors Corp., 325 F. Supp. 1089, 1094 (S.D. Ohio 1971).
177 Id. at 1096.
178 Jones Metal Prods. Co. v. Walker, 25 Ohio App. 2d 141, 267 N.E.2d 814 (Ct. App.
1971).
179 Local 246, Utility Workers v. Southern Cal. Edison Co., 320 F. Supp. 1262 (C.D. Cal.
1970); Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Grabiec, 317 F. Supp. 1304 (S.D. Ill. 1970); Richards v.
Griffith Rubber Mills, 300 F. Supp. 338 (D. Ore. 1969); Rosenfeld v. Southern Pac. Co.,
(9th Cir. 1971). Accord,
F.2d 293 F. Supp. 1219 (C.D. Cal. 1968), aff'd, Rinehart v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 4 CCH EPD f 7520 (N.D. Ohio Aug. 20, 1971).
180 3 CCH EPD 8245 (S.D. Ohio May 3, 1971).
181 OHio REv. CODE ANN. §§ 4107. 43, 4107. 45(C), and 4107. 46 (Page 1965).
182 General Electric Co. v. Hughes, 3 CCH EPD 118245, at 6821 '(S.D. Ohio May 3, 1971).
183 325 F. Supp. 1089 (S.D. Ohio 1971).
184 General Electric Co. v. Hughes, 3 CCH EPD 8245 at 6820 (S.D. Ohio May 3, 1971).
185 Id.
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In Mengelkoch v.Industrial Welfare Commission 86 the Ninth Circuit was
asked to reverse a dismissal by a three-judge court of the Central District of
California 87 of equal protection and due process attacks against the California
statute limiting the hours women could work in certain occupations. The district
court dismissed these constitutional attacks as insubstantial in view of the Muller
v. Oregon line of cases. 8 The Ninth Circuit affirmed as to the due process
attack,'8 9 but remanded the case for a fuller consideration of the equal protection
attack. 9 The court made several comments about Muller:
(1) While some of the conditions discussed in Muller as warranting
exertion of the state's police power still exist (women still differ physically from men and still bear children), their relevance and importance
today may not be the same. However, it may be seriously doubted
whether the other conditions in Muller still exist. Even if they do, their
importance may not be the same today.' 91
(2) All the conditions relied on by Muller were considered to determine
the wisdom of the legislation under the due process clause. Such a determination is no longer made today.' 92
(3) Unlike Muller, the present attack is made by an employee, rather
than an employer, and is based on the equal protection clause. The
attack alleges the statute discriminates in favor of males, while in Muller
the Supreme Court felt that the statute was necessary to safeguard a
woman's competitive position. 9'
(4) In Muller, the Supreme Court was required to emphasize differences
between the sexes to escape the holding of Lochner v. New York. 9 '
This is no longer required today.' 95
(5) Similar factors distinguish Muller's progeny, but Goesaert v. Cleary
is worthy of special comment. Goesaert'sstatement that "Michigan may
deny to all women opportunities for bartending" was made in the context of traditional legislative power to regulate liquor traffic. "We do
not regard Goesaert as establishing, beyond reasonable debate, that a
186 3 CCH EPD 118097 (9th Cir. Jan. 11, 1971). The opinion on this case has been
withdrawn from the official reportinz system. 437 F.2d xxxix (1971).
187 284 F. Supp. 950 (C.D. Cal. 1968).

188 Id.

189 3 CCH EPD 8097 at 6271-72 (9th Cir. Jan. 1971).
190 Id. at 6272-73.
191 Id. at 6272.
192 Id., citing Ferguson v.Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 730 '(1963); but see McCrimmon v.Daley,
[June, 1969-Oct. 1970, Transfer Binder] 63 CCH Lab. Cases
9512 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 31,
1970).
193 Mengelkoch v.Indus. Welfare Comm'n, 3 CCH EPD
8097 at 6272 (9th Cir. Jan.
11, 1971).
194 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
195 Mengelkoch v.Indus. Welfare Commn,3 CCH EPD 8097 at 6272 (9th Cir. Jan. 11,
1971), citing Bunting v.Oregon, 243 U.S. 426 (1917) for the proposition that states have
the police power to prescribe maximum hours for even male employees.
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statute limiting the hours of labor of women in general occupations may
not be so discriminatory against females as to offend the Equal Protection Clause."' 96
Thus, the Ninth Circuit did not express a firm opinion on the current validity of the Muller line, but felt that the above factors warranted a full consideration of a novel attack on a similar statute.'97 The court's comments do suggest
very good arguments against the modem application of Muller and Goesaert.
The Ninth Circuit next considered the propriety of the single judge's dismissal of the claim that the California statute was invalid under the supremacy
clause as inconsistent with Title VII1 9 8 The district court had dismissed this
argument on the ground of abstention, since it felt a California state court might
find the law invalid under the California Constitution. The Ninth Circuit recognized that this reason is a ground for federal abstention in some cases. However, it did not feel the abstention doctrine precluded a federal court determination where a federal policy has been established, as here, by enactment of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964.19' The equal protection and supremacy issues were
thus remanded to the district court for further consideration.
While this opinion did not expressly hold the state law invalid, it foreshadowed the Ninth Circuit's recent affirmance of Rosenfeld.2 0 In affirming the district court's opinion in Rosenfeld, the court rejected the argument that sex was a
b.f.o.q. for the position in issue either because of the nature of the job or the
California Labor Code.2 ' The court then noted that the current EEOC Guidelines take the position that state protective laws are invalid and that the United
States Supreme Court has recently noted that this administrative interpretation
of the Act is "entitled to great deference" by the courts.0 2 The Ninth Circuit
affirmed the finding of the district court.. that the state laws were invalid under
the supremacy clause insofar as they discriminate between men and women.2 '

2.

LITIGATION INVOLVING

PROHIBITIVE LEGISLATION

All of the cases addressing statutes that prohibit women from engaging in
certain occupations have dealt with barmaids. In Longacre v.State, decided on
December 31, 1968,205 the Supreme Court of Wyoming was presented with a
196 Id. at 6272-73.
197 Id. at 6273, citing Quong Wing v. Kirkendall, 223 U.S. 59, 64 (1912): "[Flaws frequently are enforced which the court recognizes as possibly or probably invalid if attacked by a
different interest or in a different way."
198 284 F. Supp. 956 (C.D. Cal. 1968). A challenge to a state statute under the supremacy
clause is not a challenge to its constitutionality under 28 U.S.C. § 2281 (1964).
See, e.g.,
Swift & Co., Inc. v. Wickham, 382 U.S. 111 (1965); Ex parte Bransford, 310 U.S. 354
(1940).
199 Mengelkoch v. Indus. Welfare Comm'n, 3 CCH EPD V 8097 at 6274 (9th Cir. Jan.
11, 1971).
200 Rosenfeld v. Southern Pacific Co., F.2d (9th Cir. 1971), aff'g 293 F.
Supp. 1219 (C.D. Cal. 1968).
201 Rosenfeld v. So. Pac. Co., F.2d
(9th Cir. 1971).
202 Id. at citing Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 434 (1971).
203 Rosenfeld v. So. Pac. Co., 293 F. Supp. 1219 (C.D. Cal. 1968).
204 Rosenfeld v. So. Pac. Co.,
F.2d
(9th Cir. 1971).
205 448 P.2d 832 (Wyo. 1968).
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conflict between Wyoming's law prohibiting women bartenders (without exception)2 . and Wyoming's later enactment of its Fair Employment Practices Act,
which prohibits employment discrimination on account of sex."'7 The court felt
the rule of construction that the specific governs the general should not apply
where the two laws are completely repugnant to each other. "How could they
possibly stand together when the state would be telling a liquor dealer on one
hand that he dare not employ a woman bartender, and on the other hand that
he dare not discriminate as to sex?" ' ° Therefore, the bartending statute has
been impliedly repealed.2 9 Two lower courts in other states have reached the
same conclusion.210 One of these courts went even further and held an ordinance invalid under the equal protection and due process clauses of both the
Minnesota and the United States Constitutions.21'
In McCrimmon u. Daley,2" plaintiffs brought a class action alleging that a
Chicago ordinance prohibiting women from tending bar, except for a woman
licensee or a wife or daughter of a male owner, was invalid under "the Constitution and laws of the United States."2 ' The district court dismissed the claim
14
on the ground that the complaint failed to state a substantial federal question,
relying on Goesaert v. Cleary." The Seventh Circuit agreed that Goesaert was
controlling "unless and until the Supreme Court determines its rationale to be no
longer compelling."21" However, it did not feel Goesaert was necessarily dispositive of the present case, since the statute in Goesaert did not except women
licensees. Thus, the Goesaert rationale of a male protective presence is inapplicable. Furthermore, the court noted that Goesaert was decided before the Civil
Rights Act of 1964. Thus, the separate issue under the supremacy clause should
211
also be addressed today.
On remand, the district court found that sex is not a b.f.o.q. for bartending
and that no reasonable relationship exists between the objects of the state's police
power and the ordinance. Therefore, the court found the ordinance void insofar as it conflicts with Title VII and void on its face under the fourteenth amendment since it deprives plaintiffs of property rights without due process."' It is
interesting to note that the district court so found without any discussion of
Goesaert v. Cleary or Muller v. Oregon.
In Krauss v. Sacramento Inn, decided on June 15, 1970,219 the United States
206 Wvo.STAT. ANN.§ 12-20 (Supp.1971).
207 Wyo. STAT.ANN. § 27-261 (1967).
208 Longacre v.State, 448 P.2d 832, 834 (Wyo.1968).
209 Id.
210 Milwaukee v. Wis. Dept. of Indus., Labor & Human Relations, 3 CCH EPD f 8125
(Wis. Cir. Ct. February 24, 1971); Jarosak v. City of Minneapolis, [June, 1967 - Oct., 1970,
Transfer Binder] 63 CCH Lab. Cases M9457 Minn. D.C. Nov. 18, 1969).
211 Jarosak v. City of Minneapolis, [June, 1969 - Oct., 1970, Transfer Binder] 63 CCH
Labor Cases %9457 (Minn. D.C. Nov. 18, 1969).
212 418 F.2d 366 (7th Cir. 1969).
213 Id.

214
215
216
217

Id. at 368.
Id. at 369.
Id.
Id. at 369-71.

218 McCrimmon v. Daley, [June, 1968 - Oct., 1970, Transfer Binder] 63 CCH Labor
Cases I 9512 '(N.D. Ill. Mar. 31, 1970).
219 314 F. Supp. 171 (E.D. Cal. 1970).
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District Court for the Eastern District of California considered the validity of
California's law prohibiting women (except the owner, licensee, or wife of either)
from tending bar.22 Plaintiff's attack was based solely on Title VII. The court
framed the issue in terms of whether the twenty-first amendment immunizes this
law from federal interference via the commerce clause.221 The court first held
that the twenty-first amendment grants the state power to regulate the sale of
liquor within borders.222 Then it declined to examine the reasonableness of the
statute under the fourteenth amendment.2 22 Even if it were to do so, the court
noted that Goesaert v. Cleary224 had upheld an almost identical Michigan
statute.225 The court then concluded that Title VII does not apply to bartenders.2 2
One limitation on this decision is, however, that the court was not specifically
asked to review the statute in relation to the fourteenth amendment. In a footnote, the court stated:
But plaintiff does not contend that this statute violates the Fourteenth
Amendment. Therefore I need not decide whether the holding of Goesaert
has been undermined by developments since 1948; e.g., the 1964 Civil Rights
Act, or whether this statute sufficiently differs from that in Goesaert to
require a different result. See McCrimmon v. Daley, 418 F.2d 366, 369-70
(7th Cir. 1969) .227
A further limitation on this decision is the opposite conclusion on the same issue
reached by the California Supreme Court in 1971.22
In Paterson Tavern & Grill Owners Association, Inc. v. Borough of Hawthorne,2 9 the Supreme Court of New Jersey considered the constitutionality of an
ordinance prohibiting licensed taverns from employing women bartenders, except
women licensees and wives of licensees. Since Title V11 2 s0 and the New Jersey
Civil Rights Act 2 1 did not apply to the facts, the court phrased the issue in terms
of whether the law was a reasonable exercise of the police power.2 2 However, it
never considered whether this issue involved the New Jersey or the Federal Constitution, or both. In reviewing earlier cases on this issue, the court acknowledged
that it had relied on Goesaert v. Cleary in a former case 232 and that Goesaert
had not been overruled, but stated that Goesaert has been subject to academic
& PROF. CODE § 25656 (West Supp. 1971).
Krauss v. Sacramento Inn, 314 F. Supp. 171, 174 (E.D. Cal. 1970).
Id. at 175-77.
Id. at 177.

220
221
222
223

CAL. Bus.

224

335 U.S. 464 (1948).

225 Krauss v. Sacramento Inn, 314 F. Supp. 171, 177 (E.D. Cal. 1970).
226 Id. at 178.
227 Id. at 177-78 n.5.
228 SaiI'er Inn, Inc. v. Kirby, 95 Cal. Rptr. 329, 485 P.2d 529 (1971), discussed in text
accompanying notes 237-66, infra.
229 57 N.J. 180. 270 A.2d 628 (1970).
230 Title VII covers employers of 25 or more employees. 78 Stat. 253, 42 U.S.C. § 20006(b)

(1964).

231 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:1-1 (1960). The court felt the N.J. Civil Rights Act would not
invalidate an otherwise valid exercise of the police power. Paterson Tavern & Grill Owners
Ass'n, Inc. v. Bor. of Hawthorne. 57 N.J. 180, 183, 270 A.2d 628, 630 (1970).
232 Paterson Tavern & Grill Owners Ass'n, Inc. v. Bor. of Hawthorne, 57 N.J. 180, 183,
270 A.2d 628, 630 (1970).
233 Guill v. City of Hoboken, 21 N.J. 574, 585-86, 122 A.2d 881, 886-87 '(1956).
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criticism.. 4 and later cases had limited its broad statement that the states are not

constitutionally precluded "from drawing a sharp line between the sexes." 2 '
However, the court felt it otiose to pursue further the constitutional issue raised
in Goesaert, since it was "satisfied that, in the light of current customs and
mores, the municipal restriction against women bartendering may no longer fairly
be viewed as a necessary and reasonable exercise of the police power; it must
therefore be stricken."2 ' Thus, the court simply refused to follow Goesaert.
One of the most recent cases invalidating a protective law is Sail'er Inn, Inc.
v. Kirby, decided on May 27, 1971.237 This case involved the same statute238
upheld in Krauss " The Supreme Court of California invalidated this law as
repugnant to the California Constitution, Title VII and the equal protection
clause. Since the California Constitution provides that a "person may not be
disqualified because of sex, from entering or pursuing a lawful business, vocation
or profession,"24 the court held the statute invalid, despite the state's arguments
that women cannot keep order in a bar, that women are subject to danger
behind a bar, and that women may commit improprieties and immoral acts in
a bar.2" On the Title VII issue, the court first addressed the question of whether
the twenty-first amendment precludes federal interference with the state regulation of liquor. It held that the twenty-first amendment does not cover the retail
sale of liquor; and even if it does, Title VII does not conflict with that amendment.24 2 The court did not squarely address the contrary result reached by a
federal court in Krauss,24 but merely stated in a footnote that it cannot agree
with Krauss' reasoning and is not bound by its holding. 4 The court then proceeded to the merits of the Title VII issue. Relying on the present EEOC Guidelines245 and recent cases,24 the court held that the statute did not create a
234 Paterson Tavern & Grill Owners Ass'n, Inc. v. Bor. of Hawthorne, 57 N.J. 180, 185, 270
A.2d 628, 630-31 (1970), citing Kanowitz, Sex-Based Discrimination in American Law, I. 11
ST. Louis U. L.J. 293, 328-29 (1967); Oldham, Sex Discriminationand State Protective Laws,

44 DENVER L.J. 344 373-74 (1967).
235 Paterson Tavern & Grill Owners Ass'r, Inc. v. Bor. of Hawthorne, 57 N.J. 180, 185,
270 A.2d 628, 631 (1970), citing, inter alia, Seidenberg v. McSorley's Old Ale House, Inc.,
308 F. Supp, 1253, 1260 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (tavern may not exclude woman patrons); United
States v. York, 281 F. Supp. 8, 16 (D. Conn. 1968) (different sentencing practices based on
sex invalid); White v. Crook, 251 F. Supp. 401, 408 (M.D. Ala. 1966) (statute prohibiting
women from serving on juries invalid).
236 Paterson Tavern & Grill Owners Ass'n, Inc. v. Bor. of Hawthorne, 57 N.J. 180, 185,
270 A.2d 628, 631 (1970). In light of Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963), it is unlikely
that a federal court would make such a statement or inquiry into reasonableness. Mengelkoch
v. Indus. Welfare Comm'n, 3 CCH EPD f 8097 at 6272 (9th Cir. Jan. 11, 1971); but see
McCrimmon v. Daley [june, 1969 - October, 1970, Transfer Binder] 63 CCH Labor Cases
ff 9512 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 31, 1970), discussed in text accompanying notes 212 - 18, supra.
237 Sail'er Inn, Inc. v. Kirby, 95 Cal. Rptr. 329, 485 P.2d 529 (1971).
238 CAL. Bus. & PRoF. CODE § 25656 (West Supp. 1971).
239 Krauss v. Sacramento Inn, 314 F. Supp. 171 (E.D. Cal. 1970), discussed in text accompanying notes 219-228, supra.
240 CAL. CONsT. art. XX. § 18 (West Supp. 1971).
241 Sail'er Inn, Inc. v. Kirby, 95 Cal. Rptr. 329, 485 P.2d 529, 533-34 (1971).
242 Id. at 535-36.
243 Krauss v. Sacramento Inn, 314 F. Supp. 171 (E.D. Cal. 1970).
244 Sail'er Inn, Inc. v. Kirby, 95 Cal. Rptr. 329, 485 P.2d 529, 538 n.12 (1971).
245 29 C.F.R. § 1604.1 (1970).
246 Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711 (7th Cir. 1969); Weeks v. Southern Bell
Tel. & Tel. Co.. 408 F.2d 228 (5th Cir. 1968); Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Grabiec, 317 F.
Supp. 1304 (S.D. Ill. 1970); Richards v. Griffith Rubber Mills, 300 F. Supp. 338 (D. Ore.
1969); Rosenfeld v. Southern Pacific Co., 293 F. Supp. 1219 (C.D. Cal. 1968).
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b.f.o.q. "[O]nly an individual inquiry into a particular woman applicant's qualifications, or, at most, a clearly justifiable general classification with respect to a
particular job category meets the requirements of section 2000e-2.'" 4 Since
today bars are unlike those of the "Wild West," a general classification based on
strength to keep order is not justifiable. Thus, the statute is invalid under the
24
supremacy clause for employers of 25 or more employees. 1
While Sailer Inn is a landmark case for each of its three theories, the equal
protection theory is especially significant. The California Supreme Court followed
a two-level test employed by the United States Supreme Court in reviewing the
validity of this statute under the equal protection clause:
In the area of economic regulation, the high court has exercised restraint, investing legislation with a presumption of constitutionality and requiring
merely that distinctions drawn by a challenged statute bear some reasonable
relationship to a conceivable legitimate state purpose. [Citations.]
On the other hand, in cases involving "suspect classification" or touching on "fundamental interests," the court has adopted an attitude of active
and critical analysis, subjecting the classification to strict scrutiny. [Citations.] Under the strict standard applied in such cases, the state bears the
burden of establishing not only that it has a compelling interest which
justifies the law but 49that the distinctions drawn by the law are necessary to
further its purpose.2
The court then stated that this statute warranted the second test, i.e., strict
scrutiny, since (1) the statute limited a fundamental right, and (2) classifications
based on sex should be treated as suspect." 0'
It is difficult to gainsay the first premise. The court cited the vintage United
States Supreme Court decision, Truax v. Raich,"' for the proposition that "the
right to work for a living in the common occupations of the community is of the
very essence of the personal freedom and opportunity that it was the purpose of
[the Fourteenth] Amendment to secure."'' The court also noted that the state
3
Labor Code declares the right to seek and hold employment a civil right."
The California Supreme Court found no specific support in United States
Supreme Court decisions for the second premise that classifications based on sex
are suspect."' Nevertheless, it did find some support in lower court decisions."'
The court analyzed other classifications which the United States Supreme Court
has declared suspect-race, national origin, alienage, poverty," 8 and stated that
the same rationale applies to sex-based classifications.
247 Sail'er Inn, Inc. v. Kirby, 95 Cal. Rptr. 329, 485 P.2d 529, 537 (1971).
248 Id. at 538.
249 Id. at 538.
250 Id. at 539, quoting Westbrook v. Milahy, 2 Cal. 3d 765, 784-85, 87 Cal. Rptr. 839,
852, 471 P.2d 487, 490 (1970).
251 239 U.S. 33 (1915).
252 Id. (Arizona statute restricting the employment of aliens is invalid as denying equal
protection under the fourteenth amendment.)
253 Sail'er Inn, Inc. v. Kirby, 95 Cal. Rptr. 329, 485 P.2d 529, 539 (1971).
254 Id.
255 Id. at 540, citing Commonwealth v. Daniel, 430 Pa. 642, 243 A.2d 400 (1968); United
States v. York, 281 F. Supp. 8 (D. Conn. 1968).
256 Sail'er Inn, Inc. v. Kirby, 95 Cal. Rptr. 329, 485 P.2d 529, 540 (1971), citing Loving
v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (race); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964) (race);
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Sex, like race and lineage, is an immutable trait, a status into which the
class members are locked by the accident of birth. What differentiates sex
from nonsuspect statuses, such as intelligence or physical disability, and
aligns it with the recognized suspect classifications is that the characteristic
frequently bears no relation to ability to perform or contribute to society.
(See Note: Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, supra, 82 Harv. L.
Rev. 1065, 1173-74.) The result is that the whole class is relegated to an
inferior legal status without regard to the capabilities or characteristics of
its individual members. (See Karczewski v. Baltimore and Ohio Railroad
Company (D.C. 1967) 274 F. Supp. 169, 179.) Where the relation between
characteristic and evil to be prevented is so tenuous, courts must look closely
at classifications based on that characteristic lest outdated social stereotypes
result in invidious laws or practices.
Another characteristic which underlies all suspect classifications is the
stigma of inferiority and second class citizenship associated with them. (See
Note: Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, supra, 82 Harv. L. Rev.
1065, 1125-27.) Women, like Negroes, aliens, and the poor have historically
labored under severe legal and social disabilities. Like black citizens, they
were, for many years, denied the right to vote and, until recently, the right
to serve on juries in many states. They are excluded from or discriminated
against in employment and educational opportunities. Married women
in particular have been treated as inferior persons in numerous laws relating
to property and independent business ownership and the right to make
contracts.
Laws which disable women from full participation in the political, business and economic arenas are often characterized as "protective" and beneficial. Those same laws applied to racial or ethnic minorities would readily
be recognized as invidious and impermissible. The pedestal upon which
women have been placed has all too often, upon closer inspection, been
revealed as a cage. We conclude that the sexual classifications are properly
treated as suspect, particularly when those classifications are made with respect to a fundamental interest such as employment. [Footnotes omitted.] 257
The court then had to balance the foregoing against the state's interest in keeping
women from tending bar. It found two asserted state interests served by the
statute: (1) that women with no interest in the liquor license will not be sufficiently restrained from committing improprieties; and (2) that women bartenders would be an unwholesome influence on young people and the general
public.25" The court discounted the first interest as "wholly arbitrary and without
support in logic or experience."25 9 The court found the second to be "even weaker
than the first." 6 ' Such a claim is contradicted by statutes that permit women
to work as cocktail waitresses and to tend bar if their husbands hold the liquor
license.

261

Finally, the court considered Goesaert v. Cleary.62 While it acknowledged
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (national origin); Takahashi v. Fish Comm.,
334 U.S. 410 (1948) (alienage); Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33 (1915) (alienage); Douglas v.
California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) (poverty); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956) (poverty).
257 Sail'er Inn, Inc. v. Kirby, 95 Cal. Rptr. 329, 485 P.2d 529, 540-41 (1971).
258 Id. at 541-42, citing Hargens v. Alcoholic Bev. App. Bd., 263 Cal. App. 2d 601 (1968);
People v. Jemnez, 49 Cal. App. 2d 739 (1942).
259 Sail'er Inn, Inc. v. Kirby, 95 Cal. Rptr. 329, 485 P.2d 529, 542 (1971).
260 Id.
261 Id.

262

335 U.S. 464 (1948).
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that Goesaert is still precedent, the court stated that its holding has been subject
to academic criticism

3

and that later cases have limited its general statement that

states are not constitutionally precluded from "drawing a sharp line between the
sexes." 2 4 However, rather than speculate as to Goesaert's continued validity, the
court stated that "the rationale for upholding the statute in that case cannot
sustain our statute." ' 5 Since the California statute permits a woman owner 2 to
66
tend bar, the protection of women by a male relative rationale did not apply.
No court has yet considered the validity of statutes prohibiting women from
working during certain periods related to childbirth. However, three courts have
considered administrative policies and regulations.
In Schattman v. Texas Employment Commission, 67 decided on March 4,
1971, plaintiff clerical worker challenged under Title VII the Texas Employment
Commission's policy that pregnant women must leave work two months prior
to the projected date of birth. The court noted that defendant had not shown
reasonable criteria to prove that all or substantially all women were unable to
perform their duties safely and efficiently at that specific time during pregnancy.
Thus, this policy could not qualify as a b.f.o.q. and was invalid.26
On May 12, 1971, in La Fleur v. Cleveland Board of Education,"" the
United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio considered a
school board regulation prohibiting teachers from working after the fourth month
of pregnancy. There, however, plaintiffs alleged the policy violated "their rights,
privileges and immunities secured by the Constitution and laws of the Civil
Rights Act of 1871,"27' rather than Title VII. The court read this as an equal
protection attack.2 1 While the theories of relief are different, the issues of
whether a rule is valid under the equal protection clause or whether it establishes
a b.f.o.q. are analogous. Thus, the court required evidence that the rule was
reasonable. Since defendant presented some convincing evidence," 2 the court
upheld the regulation, citing Muller v. Oregon."' Another equal protection
attack was made in Cohen v. Chesterfield County School Board,"4 decided five
days after La Fleur. The district court struck down a regulation requiring teach263

Sail'er Inn, Inc. v. Kirby, 95 Cal. Rptr. 329; 485 P.2d 529, 542 '(1971), citing L.
WOMEN AND THE LAW 33-34 (1969); Oldham, Sex Discrimination and State
Protective Laws, 44 DENVER L.J. 334, 373-74 (1967).
264 Sail'er Inn, Inc. v. Kirby, 95 Cal. Rptr. 329, 485 P.2d 529, 542 "(1971), citing Paterson
Tavern & Grill Owners Ass'n v. Bor. of Hawthorne, 57 N.J. 180, 270 A.2d 628, 630-31 (1971);
Seidenberg v. McSorley's Old Ale House, Inc., 308 F. Supp. 1253, 1260 (S.D.N.Y. 1969)
(tavern owner could not exclude woman patrons); United States v. York, 281 F. Supp. 8, 16
(D. Conn. 1968) (different sentencing based on sex invalid); White v. Crook, 251 F. Supp.
401, 408 (M.D. Ala. 1966) (statute prohibiting women from serving on juries invalid).
265 Sail'er Inn, Inc. v. Kirby, Supp. 95 Cal. Rptr. 329, 485 P.2d 529, 543 (1971).
266 Id., citing McCrimmon v. Daley, 419 F.2d 366, 369-70 (7th Cir. 1969), which distinguishes Goesaert on a similar basis.
267 330 F. Supp. 328 (W.D. Tex. 1971).
268 Id. at 6460.
269 326 F. Supp. 1208 (N.D. Ohio 1971).
270 Id. at 1209. The Civil Rights Act of 1871 is codified in 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1964).
271 La Fleur v. Cleveland Bd. of Educ., 326 F. Supp. 1208, 1210 (N.D. Ohio 1971).
272 Defendant showed that the regulation was adopted in response to impolite student reaction to pregnant teachers, such as giggling, pointing, snide remarking, taking bets on whether the
child might be born in the classroom or in the hall. Defendant also showed that violence had
increased in its schools during the last decade. Id.
273 Id. at 1212.
274 326 F. Supp. 1159 (E.D. Va. 1971).
KANOWITZ,
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ers to leave after the fifth month of pregnancy despite presentation of evidence
of the reasonableness of the regulation.275 The court felt such evidence did not
warrant the regulation and that the decision on when a pregnant woman should
'
Next, it reviewed
cease work is "best left up to the woman and her doctor."276
2 7
the Muller line and Goesaert v. Cleary." The court limited Goesaert to its facts
and relied on it for the statement that "[t]he Constitution in enjoining equal protection of the laws upon States precludes irrational discrimination as between
persons or groups of persons in the incidence of a law."217 In short, the court felt
that because pregnancy was "like other medical conditions, the failure to treat
it as such amounts to discrimination which is without rational basis, and therefore is violative of the equal protection clause . .. ,,7 Cohen is quite significant
in that it partially relied on Goesaert to invalidate a state protective law.

3.

LITIGATION INVOLVING CONFERRING LEGISLATION

Only two cases have considered the validity of laws conferring special
benefits on women. Potlatch Forests, Inc. v. Hays,2"' decided on October 12,
1970, involved what the court termed a "discouraging,"2' ' rather than a prohibitory, law that required, inter alia,an employer to pay time and one half to women
working in excess of eight hours per day.282 Plaintiff employer contended that
this law was invalid under the supremacy clause since it allegedly conflicted with
Title VII. Although some question existed as to the justiciability of this case (the
plaintiff was complying with the state law), the court found a real enough
controversy to decide on the merits. 282 It noted that "conflict[s] between federal
and State legislation are not to be presumed, and that both bodies of legislation
should be construed, if possible, so as to avoid conflicts between them." 2" The
court distinguished previous cases invalidating protective laws285 on the ground
that such laws were "prohibitory." 2 6 Since the Arkansas statute does not prevent
the employer from paying daily overtime to males, it does not conflict with, nor

275 The court found the argument that women were frequently incapacitated after the fifth
month to be without medical reason, and the arguments that the pregnant woman and the fetus

may be injured by being pushed and that pregnant females cannot perform all their duties

"nugatory, and based on no empirical data whatsoever." Id. at 1160.
276 Id.
277 Id. at 1161.
278 Id., quoting Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464, 466 '(1948).
279 Cohen v. Chesterfield County School Bd., 326 F. Supp. 1159, 1161 (E.D. Va. 1971).
280 318 F. Supp. 1368 (E.D. Ark. 1970).
281 Id. at 1373.
282 ARK. STAT. ANN. § 81-601 '(1960). This law also provides for time and one half pay
for women working more than forty hours per week. This aspect was not in issue since the
Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-19 (1965), provides the same. Were the employer
covered by the Walsh-Healy Act, there would have been no issue on daily overtime either, since
it provides the same for both sexes. 41 U.S.C. § 35(c) (1964).
283 Potlatch Forests, Inc. v. Hays, 318 F. Supp. 1368, 1372 "(E.D. Ark. 1970).
284 Id. at 1374.
285 Id. at 1375, citing Richards v. Griffith Rubber Mills, 300 F. Supp. 338 (D. Ore. 1970);
Rosenfeld v. Southern Pacific Co., 293 F. Supp. 1219 (C.D. Cal. 1969). The court also
cited Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711 (7th Cir. 1969); Weeks v. Southern Bell
Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228 (5th Cir. 1969). Both cases involved an employer's policy, rather
than a state law.
286 Potlatch Forests, Inc. v. Hays, 318 F. Supp. 1368, 1375 (E.D. Ark. 1970).
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impede or frustrate the purpose of, the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and is valid." "
The reader should note that Potlatch, in upholding the validity of this law,
did not imply any disagreement with the cases invalidating other types of protective laws. The court stated:
It is clear that a State statute which forbids the hiring of a woman for a
particular job or under certain conditions cannot stand in the face of a
federal statute that says that she must be hired for that job or in those conditions if she is otherwise qualified and wants to do the work. 28
The second case involved Ohio's statute requiring a suitable rest seat and
separate lunchroom for women.2"9 Plaintiffs did not challenge its validity in
Ridinger v. General Motors Corp.290 However, defendant General Motors requested a declaratory judgment that the statute was valid. Since there was no
showing that this law resulted in a denial of employment opportunities for
females, the court found that it did not conflict with Title VII. 29 1
V. An Analysis of Arguments Against Such Laws
The above cases develop the following arguments which may be made
against restrictive and prohibitive laws:
a. They are invalid under the supremacy clause.
b. They are unconstitutional under the fourteenth amendment as
denying due process.
c. They are unconstitutional under the fourteenth amendment as
denying equal protection of the laws.
d. In some states that they may have been impliedly repealed by
subsequent state Fair Employment Practice legislation.

A. Supremacy Clause
Clearly, the most effective theory for invalidating protective laws is conflict
with Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. While the legislative history on sex
discrimination is meager, what history exists may support this theory." 2 Also,
the EEOC Guidelines, albeit not always so, now clearly state that such laws are
invalid."' Although the Guidelines do not have the force of legislation or judicial
decision, the United States Supreme Court has held that they are "entitled to
287 Id.
288 Id.
289 OHIo REv. CoDE ANN. § 4107.42 (Page 1965).
290 325 F. Supp. 1089 (S.D. Ohio 1971), discussed in text accompanying notes 173-179,
supra, on the restrictive law issue.
291 Id. at 1098.
292 See text accompanying notes 72-77, supra.
293 See text accompanying note 93, supra.
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great deference" by the courts2 9 4 The opinions of several state attorneys general
contribute to this trend,295 as does the recent action by many state legislatures 96
Since it is now well established that state protective laws do not constitute
a b.f.o.q.,297 the supremacy clause theory has a great advantage because a court
may invalidate a protective law without much discussion or difficulty in distinguishing the Muller line of cases 9 Also, since an attack based on the supremacy
clause is not such a constitutional attack requiring a three-judge court,29 9 that
procedural hurdle is avoided. In short, the only deficiency in this theory is that
Title VII does not affect the validity of a state statute as applied to employers
not covered by Title VIIY'0 This fact has not gone unnoticed.30 1
B. Due Process
While good authority exists holding that federal courts no longer appraise
the reasonableness of a state's exercise of its police power under the due process
clause,' °2 some authority to the contrary exists. 03 3 Even assuming such an attack
would be dismissed by a federal court, one could assert such an argument in a
state court. There, however, one runs the risk that the state court may be more
sympathetic to the acts of its legislature than a federal court might be. Nevertheless, such attacks have been successful." 4
C. Equal Protection
Federal courts should have no reservations about examining a state law
under an equal protection attack, except perhaps by applying the abstention
doctrine s 5 However, with a view toward the Ninth Circuit's recognition that
294 Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429 '(1971).
295 See text accompanying notes 105, 108-09, supra.
296 See text accompanying notes 96-103, supra.
297 Schattman v. Texas Employment Comm'n, 330 F. Supp. 328 (W.D. Tex. 1971);
McCrimmon v. Daley [June, 1969 - Oct., 1970, Transfer Binder] 63 CCH Labor Cases j
9512 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 31, 1970); Ridinger v. General Motors Corp., 325 F. Supp. 1089 (S.D.
Ohio 1971); Local 246, Util. W. U. of Amer. v. Southern Cal. Edison Co., 320 F. Supp.
1262 (C.D. Cal. 1970); Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Grabiec, 317 F. Supp. 1304 (S.D. Ill.
1970); Richards v. Griffith Rubber Mills, 300 F. Supp. 338 (D. Ore. 1969); Rosenfeld v.
(9th Cir. 1971);
Southern Pacific Co., 293 F. Supp. 1219 (C.D. Cal. 1968), aff'd, ..... F.2d ......
Sail'er Inn, Inc. v. Kirby, 95 Cal. Rptr. 329, 485 P.2d 529 (1971). See also text accompanying
note 93, supra. Cf. Cheatwood v. South Cent. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 303 F. Supp. 754 (M.D.
Ala. 1969) employer's weight lifting restriction invalid); but cf. Gudbrandson v. Genuine
Parts Co., 297 F. Supp. 134 (D. Minn. 1968) (employer's weight lifting restriction is valid).
298 See, e.g., Richards v. Griffith Rubber Mills, 300 F. Supp. 338, 340 (D. Ore. 1969)
and text accompanying note 144, supra.
299 See note 198, supra.
300 78 Stat. 256, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d(b) (1964).
301 See text accompanying note 110, supra.
302 Mengelkoch v. Indus. Welfare Comm., 3 CCH EPD f 8097 (9th Cir. Jan. 11, 1971).
303 McCrimmon v. Daley [June, 1969-Oct., 1970, Transfer Binder] 63 CCH Labor Cases
9512 (N.D.Ill. Mar. 31, 1970).
304 See Paterson Tavern & Grill Owners Ass'n v. Borough of Hawthorne, 57 N.J. 180, 270
A.2d 628 (1970); Jarosak v. City of Minneapolis [June, 1969-Oct., 1970, Transfer Binder]
63 CCHI Labor Cases 9457 (Minn.D.C.Nov. 18, 1969).
305 See Coon v. Tingle, 277 F. Supp. 304 (N.D.Ga. 1967); cf. Krauss v. Sacramento Inn,
314 F. Supp. 171 (E.D.Cal. 1970); but cf. Sail'er Inn, Inc. v. Kirby, 95 Cal. Rptr. 329, 485
P.2d 529 (1971).
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Title VII has created a federal policy in this area, 8 ' abstention should no longer
present a barrier to an equal protection argument. Two state courts0 7 and one
federal court s have accepted an equal protection argument. Other courts have
not passed on this issue, either because it was not raised or because the court invalidated the statute under the supremacy clause. 0 ' This is unfortunate because it
has not contributed to the modem decisional law on this theory. A party asserting
an equal protection attack needs all the precedent he can marshal to attack head
on Muller and Goesaert. While this legal theory is the most difficult to advance
successfully, it may be the sole ground available if the case is not covered by Title
VII. Several good precedents support this theory. One can tenably argue that
Muller is irrelevant to this attack, since Muller involved a due process rationale.1 0
One can also argue that the federal policy created by Title VII has discredited the
rationale of both Muller and Goesaert.
In cases not involving barmaid statutes, another approach would be to
distinguish Goesaert on the facts and then cite it as authority that irrational
distinctions are prohibited by the equal protection clause, as was done in Cohen
v. Chesterfield County School Board."'1 If the case involves a statute slightly
different from that in Goesaert, one can cite good authority to hold its rationale
inapplicable.3 2 Even if the case involves a statute exactly the same as the statute
upheld in Goesaert, some authority can be cited to support invalidation. 3 3 However, this would clearly be the most difficult case, especially in a federal court.
On the other hand, the most recent United States Supreme Court decision involving the equal protection clause may indicate that Goesaert is no longer controlling. In Reed v. Reed, decided on November 22, 1971,"" the Court unanimously declared invalid under the equal protection clause an Idaho statute
declaring that males be given preference over females in appointing an estate
administrator in certain situations. The Supreme Court noted that the equal
protection clause "does not deny to States the power to treat different classes of
persons in different ways.""
(The Court cited four cases to support this
principle, 8 ' none of which involved sex classifications. Goesaert seems conspicuous by its absence.) The equal protection clause does, however, mandate
that a classification "be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon some
ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the
306 Mengelkoch v. Indus. Welfare Comm'n, 3 CCH EPD 8097 (9th Cir. Jan. 11, 1971).
307 Sail'er Inn, Inc. v. Kirby, 95 Cal. Rptr. 329, 485 P.2d 529 (1971); Jarosak v. City of
Minneapolis [June, 1969-Oct., 1970 Transfer Binder] 63 CCH Labor Cases 1 9457 (Minn.
D.C. Nov. 18, 1969); cf. Mengelkoch v. Indus. Welfare Comm'n, 3 CCH EPD 1 8097 (9th
Cir. Jan. 11, 1971); McCrinnon v. Daley, 418 F.2d 366 (7th Cir. 1969).
308 Cohen v. Chesterfield County School Bd., 326 F. Supp. 1159 (E.D. Va. 1971).
309 Local 246, Utility Workers v. Southern Cal. Edison Co., 320 F. Supp. 1262, 1267
(C.D. Cal. 1970).
310 See text accompanying note 36, supra.
311 326 F. Supp. 1159, 1161 (E.D. Va. 1971).
312 Sail'er Inn, Inc. v. Kirby, 95 Cal. Rptr. 329, 485 P.2d 529 (1971); Mengelkoch v. Indus.
Welfare Comm'n, 3 CCH EPD
8097 (9th Cir. Jan. 11, 1971).
313 Paterson Tavern & Grill Owners Ass'n v. Borough of Hawthorne, 57 N.J. 180, 270
A.2d 628 (1970).
314 40 U.S.L.W. 4013 (U.S. Nov. 22, 1971).
315 Id. at 4014.
316 McDonald v. Bd. of Election Comm'rs, 394 U.S. 802 '(1968); Railway Express Agency,
Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949); Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61
(1911); Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27 (1885).
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legislation, so that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike."' 17
The Supreme Court of Idaho had upheld the law on the theory that its objective
was to eliminate the necessity for a hearing where two or more persons are
equally entitled to act as an administrator.s" The United States Supreme Court
stated that the objecive of reducing a probate court's workload by eliminating
such hearings is "not without some legitimacy." '19 However, the Court then
held that accomplishing such an objective by giving a mandatory preference to
one sex "is to make the very kind of arbitrary legislative choice forbidden by the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."3 2
The extent to which Reed will be read by lower courts to circumvent
Goesaert remains to be seen. On the one hand, one might argue that the Court
would have expressly overruled or limited Goesaert if that was its intent. Its
holding in this case does not necessarily apply to a protective labor law. On the
other, one might argue that Goesaert was an important precedent argued before
the Court 21 and that this decision impliedly overruled Goesaert.
D. State FairEmployment Acts
Today, most states have some type of fair employment legislation which
includes a prohibition against sex discrimination.3 22 While many of these laws
specify that they are not intended to disturb protective laws, 21 one can argue
that such laws have impliedly repealed the protective laws. 2 4 Three state courts
have so ruled. 21 One state attorney general, 26 one state civil rights commission,32 7 and the EEOC 28 have also employed this theory.
VI. Conferring Laws
Laws which do not restrict a woman's employment opportunity, but which
grant her additional benefits have not been challenged by women. No doubt,
317 Reed v.Reed, 40 U.S.L.W. 4013, 4014 (U.S. Nov. 22, 1971), quoting Royster Guano
Co.v.Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920).
318 Reed v.Reed, 93 Idaho 511, 514, 465 P.2d 635, 638 (1971).
319 Reed v.Reed, 40 U.S.L.W. 4013, 4015 (U.S. Nov.22, 1971).
320 Id.
321 Appellant's brief critically cited Goesaert nine times. Brief for Appellant at 13, 14, 20,
41, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, Reed v. Reed, 40 U.S.L.W. 4013 (U.S. Nov. 22, 1971). Basically, appellant's position was:
In sum, Goesaert's sanction of "a sharp line between the sexes" and its "blind
imitation of the past" have rendered it a burden and an embarrassment to state and
federal courts; enlightened jurists politely discard it as precedent, refusing "to be
obfuscated by medieval views regarding the legal status of women." It should be
plain that no one would now mourn its formal burial. Id. at 49.
It is interesting to note, however, that Appellee's brief did not rely on Goesaert as authority
to sustain the validity of the Idaho statute. Brief for Appellee, Reed v. Reed, 40 U.S.L.W.
4013 (U.S. Nov. 22, 1971).
322 WOMaN's BUREAU, U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, LAWS ON SEx DiscRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT 3 (1970).
323

See notes 106-07, supra.

324 See note 102, supra.
325 See note 103, supra.
326 See note 105, supra.
327 See note 104, supra.
328 CoMM. DEc. No. 70-382, Dec., 1969, CCH EMPL. PRhc. GuIDE,

6091 (D.C. hour law).
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women feel such a challenge is unnecessary. Only two cases have dealt with the
validity of this type law, and in each the issue was raised by the employer. Both
cases upheld the validity of such legislation. 29 Indeed, in one the employer did
not contest the validity of an Ohio law providing special facilities for women, but
merely wished a declaration that it was valid. The court found the law valid on
the theory that it did not discriminate against women; 30 it did not address
whether such a law discriminates against males. This issue was addressed in the
other case, which involved a statute providing for premium overtime pay for
women. The court felt the law was valid since the employer could give the same
benefit to males. 33 ' Thus, these two precedents suggest no arguments against such
laws, but rather indicate they are generally valid.
It is possible, however, that some of these laws may yet be attacked by
women; e.g., if an employer forces a woman to take a rest period and refuses to
pay her for that time, she might attack such a law on the same theories applicable
to restrictive and prohibitive laws. Also, a male might attack any law providing
special benefits for women on the theory that it discriminates against males.
VII. Are Restrictive Laws Invalid on Their Face?
The foregoing legislative, judicial and administrative developments indicate
a trend toward invalidation or repeal of prohibitive and restrictive legislation.
The author feels a clean sweep is likely in regard to prohibitive legislation. However, before reaching a conclusion in regard to restrictive laws, this section will
consider whether such legislation is valid in every situation.
Clearly, those states that have repealed their hour and weight restrictions 3 2
feel such laws are no longer relevant to today's working woman. Likewise, every
decision invalidating such laws has held them unconstitutional on their face, 33
rather than as applied. The author agrees with such results where women do not
desire the protection of such laws, but questions what a court might do if female
workers seek the protection of these laws. 34 In such cases the state's labor department might advance the following arguments:
329 Ridinger v. General Motors Corp., 325 F. Supp. 1089 (S.D. Ohio 1971); Potlatch
Forests, Inc. v. Hays, 318 F. Supp. 1368 (E D. Ark. 1970).
330 Ridinger v. General Motors Corp., 325 F. Supp. 1089, 1098 (S.D. Ohio 1971).
331 Potlatch Forests, Inc. v. Hays, 318 F. Supp. 1368, 1375 (E.D. Ark. 1970).
332 See text accompanying notes 96-97, supra.
333 See cases discussed in Section IV. B, supra.
334 Consider the following hypothetical cases involving female employees of the Frantin
Belt and Strap Factory, Inc.:
Case 1. Mary Smith is a widow with three young children. She leaves her children with
a local day care center while she works the 9:00 A.M. to 5:00 P.M. shift. She has no one to
care for the children after 6: 00 P.M. when the day care center closes.
Mary is told by her supervisor that she must work three hours overtime per day for the
next two weeks. She declines, citing the state's labor code which prohibits her working over
eight hours per day. Her supervisor, however, sympathizes with "Women's Lib" and tells her
that the state law is no longer valid since it denies her an employment opportunity. Mary
states that she is not "into Women's Lib" and that she knows her place in society. She again
declines and is fired.
Case 2. Sally Jones is a petite, and not overly strong, worker. She is transferred into a
position requiring the occasional lifting of 35-pound objects. Sally requests a transfer back to
her old job, citing the state's labor law on weights for females. She is then told that her old
position no longer exists, and that if she desires to remain with the company, she must do her
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1. The application of the state law in this case is clearly to protect
women. Congress could not have intended to invalidate the law in this
case. Title VII should not be construed to permit employers to take advantage of women. 3 5

2. Despite what the EEOC Guidelines say, 38 the protective law is
not archaic 31 7 and is still relevant in this case.
3. Conflicts between state and federal law are not to be presumed
and both laws should be construed, if possible, to avoid conflicts.338 No
overriding federal policy will be restrained if the state law is upheld in
this situation. The woman is not being denied an employment opportunity.
Unless chivalry is completely dead, such arguments would not be lightly
dismissed. 339 On the other hand, the employer could assert:
1. All the recent cases invalidating state protective legislation have
found them invalid on their face, rather than as applied.3 40 This generally accords with the EEOC's position.34 If a law has previously been
held invalid on its face, it should not be resurrected by a party hoping
to claim its protection.
2. Following the state law discriminates against males, since males
do not have the option to claim its coverage. This could adversely affect
a male employee's "status"342 and "privileges of employment,"'34 3 if, for
example, a male of greater seniority were placed on second shift or required to work more overtime than he desired, or assigned to a job
requiring lifting of heavy objects. Clearly, Title VII protects males
4
also.S 4

work. Finally, the strain becomes too much for Sally and she refuses to lift any more heavy
objects. Sally is fired.
Case 3. Peggy Brown is twenty years old and works the same shift as Mary Smith. Peggy
is asked to transfer to second shift to accommodate the needs of the business. The second shift
ends at 1:00 A.M. Peggy declines the transfer, citing the labor law prohibiting the employment of females under twenty-one (or females of any age) after midnight. The employer tells
her she has the option of working second shift or of leaving. Peggy refuses and is fired.
335 General Electric Co. v. Hughes, 3 CCH EPD 1 8245 at 6820. See text accompanying
note 184, supra. Cf. Ward v. Luttrell, 292 F. Supp. 165, 168 (E.D. La. 1968); see also Jones
Co. v. Walker, 25 Ohio App. 2d 141. 267 N.E.2d 814 '(Ct. App. 1971).
336 See text accompanying note 93, supra.
337 Many states have recently amended their protective laws. See text accompanying note
111, supra.
338 Potlatch Forests, Inc. v. Hays, 318 F. Supp. 1368, 1374 (E.D. Ark. 1970).
339 To avoid the exposure of becoming a party to a landmark case reversing the present
trend where the facts warrant it, an employer might wish to consider alternatives for the above
employees. For example, in case 1 (footnote 326), he could ask male employees, or women
who so desired, to work a little extra overtime. In case 2, he could rearrange the duties of the
job as far as practicable. In case 3, he could schedule his shifts so that the second shift ends
at midnight or merely assign only males to that shift. Of course, such alternatives may not
always be practicable for many reasons. For example, an employer might not wish to incur
the exposure of a complaint by a male on a reverse discrimination theory. Thus, the employer
must consider meeting the likely arguments of the state labor department.
340 See Section IV. B., supra.
341 See text accompanying note 93, supra.
342 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1964).
343 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2) (1964).
344 See Diaz v. Pan American World Airways, 442 F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 1971); Roberts v.
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3. Following the state law might tend to make employers generally
reluctant to hire women. Even though this would clearly be unlawful,
every violation of Title VII will not become redressed. Thus, by abolishing special treatment for women, the policy of equal employment opportunity for women will be furthered.
Under the present state of the law, the employer's arguments would probably prevail.
CONCLUSION
A. Summary of the Present State of the Law
Prohibitive laws in conflict with Title VII are generally no longer valid.
While there remains some doubt when a case is not covered by Title VII, there
are certainly good arguments against such laws on grounds other than Title VII.
The same is true of restrictive laws. Even if a woman desires the protection of
a restrictive law, such legislation is generally invalid, especially in those jurisdictions where such legislation has previously been declared invalid on its face. In
other jurisdictions the question is more difficult. However, since the better legal
theory indicates such laws are invalid even in this situation, it is likely that these
jurisdictions will follow this theory. While no conferring legislation has yet been
declared invalid, many or all of such laws may yet be so declared.
B. Some Observations
The author sees no justification for any law that forbids women from engaging in any occupation they choose or working at their jobs late in pregnancy or
after having recently given birth to a child. A woman's right should be equal to
a male's.
Nor does present justification exist for restricting a woman's employment
opportunities where she does not desire such restrictions. While there is a harder
policy question where a woman actually desires the protection of a restrictive law,
that law should nevertheless be declared invalid. If equal employment opportunity for women is to become a reality, they will have to work under the
same conditions as men, and cannot claim unique employment prerogatives.
While some hardship may result, the common good of all women necessitates this
conclusion. The hardest of such cases involves forcing a woman to lift heavy
objects. The author does not feel that women should be forced to lift weights
beyond their capability. Neither, however, should males. Here the Federal

General Mills, Inc., 40 U.S.L.W. 2188 (N.D. Ohio 1971) (male's right to wear long hair);
Rosen v. Pub. Service Elect. & Gas Co., 328 F. Supp. 454 (D. N.J. 1971) (better pension plan
for females); Comm. DECIsIoN No. 71-1529, April. 2, 1971, CCH EMPL. PRAc. GumE
6231 (male's right to long hair); see also Caterpillar Tractor v. Grabiec, 317 F. Supp. 1304,
1306 (S.D. Ill. 1970) (by implication: Illinois law forces employers to impose "primarily upon
male employees the burdens of overtime work").
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Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970... and many state laws on the same
subject348 might and should be interpreted to prevent this abuse.
Many conferring laws may remain in force since no precedents invalidate
them, they do not create major problems, and they may be unlikely to be challenged by women. Nevertheless, the author sees little usefulness in them. To the
extent that they support the theory that women are "the weaker sex," they should
be repealed or invalidated. If a legislature is concerned about seats and rest
periods, it can pass legislation covering both sexes.
The foregoing survey and discussion show that in many cases and in many
states an employer may properly disregard state protective laws on several different theories. Hopefully, this article will assist an employer in making his
decisions in his particular case. However, since the present state of the law in
each state is unique and since new developments occur quite frequently, the
employer should thoroughly research the law in his state before making his
decision. While there appears to be a trend toward total abolition of these laws,
it may be a mistake to rely on this generality in every situation at this time.
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29 U.S.C. § 651-678 (Supp. May, 1971). Section 654 provides:
(a) Each employer(1) shall furnish to each of his employees employment and a place of employment
which are free from recognized hazards that are causing or are likely to cause death
or serious physical harm to his employees.
(2) shall comply with occupational safety and health standards promulgated
under this chapter.
While no standard on weight lifting has issued as yet, subsection (1) is broad enough to cover it.
346 E.g., HA wii REv. LAws §§ 96-5 to 96-8 (1968); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 48, §§ 137.2,
.7, .17, .18 (Smith-Hurd 1969); MICH. ComP. LAws §§ 408.852-53 (Supp. 1971).

